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ABSTRACT

A review of modern police history shows the trend of increased division of labor
within police agencies. However, police organizations are often criticized for creating
specialized police units when they are faced with specific problems or are not effectively
tackling local problems. Other challenges from within the profession include potential
inter-unit conflicts or indifference of officers from other units that may hinder program
implementation by specialized units. The present study looked into the changing
characteristics of specialized units within police departments between 2000 and 2007.
This research also examined whether creation of specialized community policing units
(CP Units) influences the community policing activities performed by police agencies.
The results show that wide variations exist in the operation of specialized police
units among police agencies. Specifically, the increase of some specialized units (e.g.,
cyber-crime, hate crime, missing child, and terrorism units) seems to reflect social
changes and police departments’ responses to tackle diverse problems arising from such
changes. Also, linear panel analysis indicates that police agencies with CP Units were
more likely to produce outputs in each element of community policing (i.e., community
engagement, problem-solving, and organizational transformation). In other words, the
creation of specialized units may lead to the increase of outputs that the units are intended
and designed to produce.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In The Wealth of Nations, one of the most influential works of the 18th century,
Smith (1902 [1776]) wrote extensively about the concept of division of labor. For
example, he demonstrated that productivity measured by the number of pins
manufactured per day in a workshop increased 240 times after dividing the process into
18 separate jobs as compared to when a single worker produced pins one at a time.
Smith maintained that significant improvement of productivity through the
division of labor is due to three factors: (1) enhancement of dexterity; (2) time savings
from not shifting from one stage to another; and (3) use of “proper machinery.” First,
enhancement of dexterity refers to the increase in sophistication in skills acquired through
repetition (i.e., practice). Second, workers can be more effective by eliminating
unnecessary processes caused by transferring from one stage to another. Third, use of
proper machinery refers to the choice of appropriate tools to achieve organizational goals.
Smith’s analysis is based on observations from the manufacturing sector.
However, the division of labor principles strategically divides tasks among team
members to achieve their goals (Letterer, 1973). Thus, these concepts can also be applied
to many organizations—public or private, profit or non-profit, and service- or
manufacturing-oriented—including police departments.
The principles of division of labor were later expanded by Weber (1947) as part
of his influential work in changing how organizations are structured. Weber (1947:219)
argued that in organizations where division of labor is realized, “different persons
perform different types of work and that these are combined in the service of common
ends, with each other and with the non-human means of production, in the most varied
1

ways.” Therefore, work is divided not only among organizational members but also
among various types of technology to achieve a common goal. Division of labor is now
one of the core elements of bureaucracy that make it “capable of attaining the highest
degree of efficiency” (Weber, 1968:223). Weber believed that division of labor was a key
factor of bureaucracy that made it superior to other types of organizations (March and
Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1961).
After World War I, division of labor became “a basic principle,” with the support
from the scientific management approach suggested by Taylor (Etzioni, 1964:22). Taylor
(1947) argued that investigation and division of work processes can greatly increase
production efficiency in organizational outcomes.
A review of modern police history also shows division of labor within the
organizational structure. For instance, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the first
modern police organization in the world, was established in London, England in 1829. At
that time, the department had about 1,000 officers and was composed of eight divisions
(MPS, 2012). Less than two centuries later, the same police agency employs 32,370
sworn officers and 13,970 civilian staff. In addition, the organizational chart of the MPS
reveals a high-level of specialization not unlike large private organizations (MPS, 2012).1
Organizational complexity is similar throughout police departments in the United
States. As an example, the organizational chart of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police
Department shows that the Bureau of Community Policing (BOCP) provides patrol
1

A distinction can be made between division of labor as a general concept and specialization as a particular
form of division of labor. Organization theorists as well as policing scholars have used multiple terms when
addressing division of labor including “specialization,” “division of work,” “functional differentiation,” or
“horizontal differentiation” (e.g., Hall et al., 1967; Letterer, 1973; Mastrofski and Ritti, 2000; Parks,
Mastrofski, DeJong, and Gray, 1999; Pfeffer, 1982; Skogan and Frydl, 2004). Because these terms have
been used interchangeably in prior research, this dissertation will also treat them as referring to the same
concept.
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service through nine separate Districts (Figure 1.1). Under the Bureau of Criminal
Investigation and Support (BOIS), there are 19 specialized units. The Bureau of
Professional Standards (BOPS) has five units, and the Bureau of Auxiliary Service
(BOAS) has eight units. Under chief of staff, five separate units are also in operation.
Such a fine-grained degree of police specialization is a relatively new
phenomenon. During the late 19th century and early 20th century, police departments did
not have as many specialized units as they do now (Reiss, 1992). As will be discussed in
more detail later, police departments in the United States have undergone increasing
specialization of their organizational structures since the late 19th century (Mastrofski and
Willis, 2010).
However, police organizations are often criticized for creating specialized police
units when they are faced with specific problems or are not effectively tackling local
problems (Moore, 1992). Scholars have tended to regard police departments’ dependence
on establishing specialized units as a temporary strategy to calm criticisms related to
agencies’ incompetence in solving local crime problems. That is, creation of specialized
units has been considered a transitory response to relieve public attack on police
departments, rather than reflecting a result of rational organizational decision-making to
increase effectiveness and efficiency (Crank and Langworthy, 1992). For instance,
research has shown that police departments set up gang units following pressure from
communities and politicians, not from the necessity to proactively tackle gang problems
in a more efficacious manner (Katz and Webb, 2004).
Despite the prevalence of specialized units within police agencies, scholars have
devoted little effort to studying the effectiveness of such units. Some researchers have
3

studied the processes by which police organizations create specialized units (e.g., Katz,
2001), but only a few studies have examined how such units affect the outputs of police
departments (e.g., Maguire, 2009). Therefore, there is limited understanding of how
specialization affects organizational behavior overall.
Researchers have only recently started to investigate factors that affect the
structure of police organizations and the effectiveness of different structural
configurations. These discussions tend to be normative or descriptive rather than
empirical (Crank and Langworthy, 1992; Maguire and Uchida, 2000), which is not
unique to studies on police departments (Scott, 1975). Normative theories can sometimes
be useful because researchers can identify factors that describe variations among police
agencies (Langworthy, 1986). Yet, in many cases, normative theories are problematic
because they do not try to explain variations in police organizations and discuss
variations from predetermined criteria as “anomalies” or “suboptimal” (Langworthy,
1986:12).
In addition, when examining change within police organizations, most researchers
look to the overall departmental structure. For instance, Langworthy (1986) investigated
the determinants of five dimensions of formal organizational structure: administrative
overhead, and spatial, occupational, hierarchical, and functional differentiation.
Organizational size was found to be correlated with spatial differentiation (i.e., the degree
of an agency’s geographic dispersion), while technology was significantly related to
functional differentiation (i.e., the degree of an agency’s task division).

4

Figure 1.1. Organizational Chart of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department

Source: Website of the Metropolitan Police Department, City of St. Louis, MO (http://www.slmpd.org)
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Maguire (2003) later expanded upon the study of Langworthy (1986) and
extended the work to investigate the causal linkage between context, complexity, and
control of police organizations. However, Langworthy (1986) and Maguire (2003) both
treated specialization as a dependent variable, not an independent variable. Therefore,
while their work is useful for understanding the conceptualization and antecedents of
specialization, it is not useful for thinking about the effects of specialization.
Some scholars have examined the formation of specialized units within police
agencies (e.g., Katz, 2001; Katz, Maguire, and Roncek, 2002). Whether such units
produce the intended outputs, however, has not received much scholarly attention, with
the exception of Maguire (2009). As Klinger (2004:127) suggested, “Those seeking to
make the police more efficient . . . have argued that increasing the occupational and
functional complexity of police agencies would allow departments to commit specially
trained officers and units to specific problems.” Nevertheless, investigation of the causal
mechanism between structural changes (i.e., creation of specialized units) and
performance change has not satisfactorily drawn a firm conclusion (Klinger, 2004).
The association between the establishment of specialized units and outputs also
can be understood in terms of its structure-strategy relationship. In fact, the relationship
between structure and strategy is one of the most investigated and controversial issues
among organization theorists. To date, however, the causal mechanisms have not been
identified between the two variables (e.g., Amburgey and Dacin, 1994; Hall and Saias,
1980). Thus, examining whether specialized units affect organizational outputs of police
agencies may provide insight into the causal association between structure and strategy.
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More importantly, the recent trend of specialization in police departments needs
to be considered in conjunction with the introduction of a new policing approach that has
been adopted by police agencies across the country, community policing. Community
policing has gained widespread popularity since the 1970s and has dramatically changed
the way police agencies operate and structure their organizations. Community policing
approaches encourage police to help their communities engage in local policing and to
adopt a problem-solving approach in daily job performance. This community-focused
perspective encourages departmental restructuring so that every rank-and-file officer can
engage in community policing activities. Specifically, community policing proponents
advocate despecialization of police organizations (Mastrofski and Willis, 2010). Thus,
the popularity of community policing approaches by police organizations contrasts with
departments’ increasing reliance on specialized units. In other words, conflicting attitudes
among scholars and practitioners may exist regarding the appropriate organizational
design after the introduction of community policing strategies. Accordingly, investigating
how police agencies handle the conflicting challenges and demands between the ideal
scenario (i.e., community policing approach) and the current reality (i.e., specialization of
the organizations) is critical.
In this context, the present study investigates whether creation of community
policing units alters the community policing activities performed by police agencies.
More specifically, the goal of this dissertation is to examine how specialized police units
affect outputs of police agencies. Therefore, the existence of a community policing unit is
a key independent variable in explaining output changes in the area of community
policing. Unlike prior research, however, the current study introduces three distinct
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elements of community policing to determine whether specialized units play a similar
role in each element of community policing program implementation. Another innovation
in this study is in the analysis of longitudinal data to examine the causal relationship
between creating units and their effects on outputs.
This study will expand the understanding of community policing in two novel
ways. First, multi-wave data are used to track specialized units within police departments.
Prior research has mostly relied on a single wave of data. When multi-wave data have
been used, studies tended to describe changes (e.g., Maguire, 1997). In contrast, this
research looks to explain the effect of specialized units on the change of outputs using
panel data. That is, this dissertation is more focused on the causal association between the
creation of a specialized unit and its outputs. Because cross-sectional data can pose some
challenges in identifying causality among variables, longitudinal panel data are used to
investigate the relationship.
Second, this dissertation measures the output changes of different community
policing elements (i.e., multiple dependent variables) in order to track different functional
consequences of community policing. One of the most frequently investigated areas in
the policing literature, community policing programs have been extensively studied, but
the application of diverse criteria and approaches of different investigators has made it
challenging to compare results across studies. The present study attempts to resolve this
confusion and increase external validity of its results by using three distinct elements of
community policing—community engagement, problem-solving, and organizational
transformation—as three separate dependent variables. This approach will determine
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whether units devoted to community policing have any effect on the outputs produced by
those police agencies.

OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION
The remainder of the dissertation is composed of five chapters. Chapter 2
provides a review of the literature on specialization of organizations. The chapter begins
with an overview of research on organizational specialization and expands to the analysis
of policing research on specialized units within police agencies. The discussion includes
reasons why specialization is an important issue in examining police organizations.
Chapter 3 discusses the reasons why community policing units and community
policing activities were chosen for this study. It is crucial to understand the impact of
community policing on American police organizations. Thus, the chapter provides a brief
introduction to key elements of community policing. More specifically, it discusses the
relationship between community policing approaches and specialization (or
despecialization) within police departments.
Chapter 4 describes the data and methods employed in the dissertation. The
chapter explains the relative strengths and weaknesses of datasets used in this field
research. In addition, it discusses general issues involved in variable construction and
defines how the specific dependent and independent variables were constructed for this
study. Because my research is on the causal association between the creation of
community policing units and outputs from community policing activities, I will perform
a linear panel analysis. The rationale for choosing this statistical technique will be
elaborated in this chapter.
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The results of the analyses will be provided in Chapter 5. Descriptive statistics
will show how numerous specialized units emerged and changed in the first decade of the
21st century. Further, linear panel analysis results will show the causal relationship
between the creation of specialized community policing units and community policing
program outputs.
Lastly, a discussion of pragmatic implications will be presented in Chapter 6,
along with limitations of the present study and a proposed agenda for future research.

10

CHAPTER 2. SPECIALIZATION OF POLICE ORGANIZATIONS

Specialization has evolved into a key feature of most organizational structures
(Mastrofski and Ritti, 2000). Specialization is characterized by the establishment of
specialized units, or “specialist units,” within police agencies, each devoted to a different
aspect of the organization’s goals (Mastrofski and Ritti, 2000). Similarly, Maguire
(2009:45) defined specialization of police organizations as “the division of work into
defined tasks and the assignment of those tasks to functionally distinct organizational
units.”
As discussed in the previous chapter, police administrators have relied
increasingly on the creation of specialized units to address local problems, but
researchers have placed less emphasis on the organizational outputs resulting from
specialization. That is, specialization has been merely one part in the discussion of police
departments (e.g., Langworthy, 1986; Maguire, 2003). Recently, a few researchers have
paid more attention to the process by which specialized units are created (e.g., Katz,
2002), but studies have generally overlooked how such specialized police units play a
role in producing outputs, with a notable exception of Maguire (2009). Put another way,
specialization has been mostly used as a dependent variable, not as an independent
variable in explaining organizational outputs. Therefore, although most police
departments operate a variety of specialized units, we have a limited understanding of the
outputs produced by such units, as well as of the scope of functional specialization.
It is critical to investigate the role of specialized units within police departments
for three reasons. First, establishment of specialized units impacts resource allocation. As
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such, it can become a source of conflict among different units, which leads to problems
of coordination among units (Clift, 1970; March and Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1961). As
will be shown later, early policing scholars cautioned that police leaders should not rely
on specialized units more than necessary because of the cost involved in the coordination
process across units (e.g., Wilson, 1973). Thus, as a first step to examine the role of
specialized units, this dissertation will examine whether police departments that establish
units to perform specific tasks are more likely to increase outputs.
Second, whether such units play a role in producing outputs related to community
policing is not clear. Research has largely ignored the causal relation between the
creation of specialized units and the outputs generated by them. Also, as will be discussed
later, some studies (e.g., Rutherford, Blevins, and Lord, 2008) have tended to investigate
outcomes (e.g., reduction of crime or fear of crime, increase of satisfaction with police,
increase of arrest rates, etc.) and their correlates. In contrast, outputs resulting from
organizational inputs, however, have not received much scholarly attention. Only a few
studies have provided a cross-sectional analysis of a certain type of specialized unit (i.e.,
gang unit), but the effect of such specialized units on outputs has not been explored (e.g.,
Langton, 2010).
Finally, research on specialized units can provide insight regarding the association
between organizational structure and strategies. For instance, are organizational
structures antecedents of strategies, or do strategies follow structure? This question has
been fundamental in organization research (see Amburgey and Dacin, 1994; Hall and
Saias, 1980) and causal analysis of specialized units and their activities may provide an
answer. Research on the effects of specialized units can also provide a better
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understanding of how police organizations function. Consequently, police leaders can
benefit from this research because the results may have implications for designing the
structure of police organizations to produce intended outputs.
This chapter will provide a brief overview of specialization and the reasons for
specialization within organizations writ large. In addition, I will discuss several key
features of specialization and identify types of specialization. Next, the circumstances
under which specialization is a sound response to organizational goals will be suggested
and the effect of specialization will be examined. Lastly, I will review policing research
that investigates specialization within police departments with special attention paid to
the effect of specialized units on organizational outputs.

SPECIALIZATION OF ORGANIZATIONS
As briefly noted in Chapter 1, division of labor within an organization can
contribute to a great increase of productivity. Discussion on the division of labor,
however, has not been limited to the realm of formal organizations (Filley, House, and
Kerr, 1976). Rather, works on division of labor have identified how this process affects
society beyond any single organization (Durkheim, 1933).
It is worth noting at this point that the term “specialization” in this study refers to
specialization of task, not of people. Task specialization, according to Thompson
(1961:25), refers to “making activities more specific,” while specialization of people
means “the adaptation of the individual to the conditions of his existence.” Thus, in an
organization where tasks are specialized, workers are not necessarily specialized only
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because they can perform such specialized tasks, given that workers easily can replace
fellow workers.
Classical organization theories propose a basic principle in specializing
organizational tasks: organization members need to be grouped together by the purpose,
process, clientele, or geographical area of their tasks (Etzioni, 1964). However, Etzioni
(1964) argued that organizations often do not necessarily follow these principles and
numerous other factors may affect how organizations divide their tasks (e.g., culture,
environment, political settings, resources, etc.). Similarly, in analyzing the interactions
between organizations and their surrounding environments, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967)
proposed that organizations differentially create specialized units to respond to
environmental pressure and demands. In other words, not all specialized units have the
same structural features. Instead, specialized units are created and function differently
depending on the environment and required tasks to perform.
Blau (1970) suggested that specialization, or functional differentiation, is one of
four dimensions of formal organizations. The other three are spatial, occupational, and
hierarchical differentiation. Regarding division of labor, Blau (1970:203) argued that:
The division of labor typifies the improvement in performance attainable through
division. The more completely simple tasks are separated from various kinds of
complex ones, the easier it is for unskilled employees to perform the routine
duties and for skilled employees to acquire the specialized training and experience
to perform the different complex ones. Further subdivision of responsibilities
occurs among functional divisions, enabling each one to concentrate on certain
kinds of work.

In short, from small workshops during the industrial revolution era to very
complex modern companies, specialization has become a key feature of many
organizations. Specialization has been hailed as an organizational tool that can
14

dramatically increase efficiency and effectiveness. Specific reasons for such
specialization, however, warrant further discussion.

REASONS FOR THE DIVISION OF LABOR
Why do organizations apply the principle of division of labor in their structure?
Put simply, why do organizations divide their functions into smaller tasks? Based on the
study of 53 employment security agencies in the United States, Blau (1970) found that
organizational size was positively correlated with functional differentiation. That is, as
the number of employees increased, organizations were likely to have more subdivisions
and distinct positions. However, Blau (1970) also maintained that the rate of increase in
differentiation slows as the size increases.
Daft and Bradshaw (1980) later claimed that the effect of organization size on
specialization is not as straightforward as proposed by Blau (1970). They asserted that
organization members make conscious decisions on structural differentiation—horizontal
differentiation was their term—for a variety of reasons that are independent of size. For
instance, Thompson (1961) posited that “a stable environment and a guarantee of
continuity of function” is required for an organization to specialize its tasks.
More specific reasons for the division of work were suggested by Litterer (1973).
First of all, the knowledge and specialty that a person can have is necessarily limited. For
instance, one person cannot achieve the goal of manufacturing cars. Lots of experts, from
engineering to design, need to be involved in the separate stages of making a car.
Likewise, a single medical doctor cannot provide numerous medical services ranging
from basic treatments to performing complex surgeries. Similarly, it could be extremely
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difficult for one police officer to provide patrol, traffic, homicide investigation, and
terrorist intelligence gathering within a single department. Thus, each worker can focus
on his/her limited scope of tasks by dividing works into smaller components and
specializing duties.
Second, as Smith (1902 [1776]) argued, far more output is possible through
division of labor. As mentioned above, workers can produce many more pins in a given
periods of time when they divide the processes of pin making. Repeating the same tasks,
accumulation of knowledge, and training through trial-and-error improve the productivity
of output possible for workers and yield products that are more standardized in design
and quality.
Lastly, different aspects of tasks can be performed at the same time, which
Litterer (1973) described as “concurrent operations.” For instance, in making pins, the
straightening, pointing, and twisting of wires can be carried out at the same time. Without
the division of labor, workers have to start from straightening to twisting wires in an
orderly manner. Organizations that have a high degree of specialization, on the other
hand, can carry out numerous jobs at the same time, which leads to increased
performance efficiency.

HOW TO DIVIDE WORK
Dividing the component steps of a task and allocating these tasks to appropriate
staff members is challenging for many organizations, partly because division of labor
often requires organizations to invest vast resources, like machinery, personnel, and
preparation for operating procedures. Thus, Scott (2003:234) noted that “one of the most
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difficult and critical of all decisions facing an organization is how work is to be
divided—what tasks are to be assigned to what roles, roles to work units, and units to
departments.” In fact, as is shown later, the limited research on police specialized units
has been focused on this niche issue of the specialization process (e.g., Giblin, 2006;
Katz, 2001; Katz, Maguire, Roncek, 2002).
Departmentalization reflects how division of labor is expressed in the structure of
complex and formal organizations. Departmentalization is defined as “how jobs may be
grouped together into work units in order to meet individual or organizational goals”
(Filley, House, and Kerr, 1976). Divisions, bureaus, departments, or units are some
examples of these groupings. Examining how organizations departmentalize their
functions can reveal how work is divided to achieve the goals.
Filley, House, and Kerr (1976) argued that departmentalization can be divided
into two forms: goal-oriented and process-oriented. In goal-oriented departmentalization,
organizations form divisions, bureaus, or units based on products or geographic areas to
achieve their goals. For instance, units in several different geographic areas can have
their own staff to accomplish their organizational goals. Organizations can proactively
implement problem-solving activities or provide services to their customers. Also, each
unit can function autonomously with its own skills and personnel to achieve goals. A
disadvantage, however, is that duplication of resources among units may be inevitable
due to replication of the same infrastructure in different units (e.g., administrative
assistants, office facilities, etc.).
On the other hand, process-oriented or functional departmentalization focuses on
how organizations utilize their limited resources more efficiently. Organizations structure
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divisions, bureaus, or units based on processes to accomplish overall goals. For instance,
motor companies structure their organizations by creating sales, engineering, and
manufacturing departments. Thus, each department is grouped based on specialty and
resources can be maximized.
Examples of goal- and process-oriented types of departmentalization are
presented in Figure 2.1. A mixture of both goal-oriented and functional
departmentalization is adopted by many organizations (Child, 1984). When organizations
focus on the efficient use of resources in a stable environment, functional
departmentalization is preferred (Filley, House, and Kerr, 1976).
It is worth noting that division of labor is not ideal for every situation (Letterer,
1973). The following factors are necessary for division of labor to be effective in an
economic sense. First, a high volume of work is needed. When similar work demand is
repeated for a relatively long time, division of labor is recommended. For instance, if
customer complaints keep increasing, a department store may want to create a new unit
solely responsible for training their personnel to interact skillfully with customers.
Second, stability of volume and demand is an important factor in considering
division of work. When there is a temporarily high volume of work, then division of
work may not be necessary. In the example of the department store, if the complaints
suddenly decrease, then the division of personnel training and evaluation may not be
warranted.
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Figure 2.1. Goal-Oriented and Process-Oriented Departmentalization
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Third, a change in technology or strategy within the organizations may call for
specialized staffing. For instance, the introduction of a self-payment system in a retail
store may require a specialized unit that can maintain the technological equipment.

EFFECTS OF DIVISION OF LABOR
Research has revealed that increased division of labor within organizations can
have several consequences on organizational structure and functions. First, specialization
is claimed to decrease the scope of responsibilities performed by units or departments,
which leads to ease in carrying out tasks and increased productivity (Blau, 1970;
Mintzberg, 1979). However, research also shows mixed results regarding improved
performance (Filley, House, and Kerr, 1976).
Second, the division of labor influences the solidarity among division members.
Blau (1970:217) argued that increased differentiation, or division of labor, increased
“inter-unit heterogeneity.” Employees expressed more solidarity among colleagues
within the same subunits and had more potential for conflicts and indifference with
people outside of the units. In addition, the number and characteristics of interactions
among workers can be different depending on the division of labor or work design
(Letterer, 1973). Letterer argued that members within the same unit tend to have their
own subgoals and social norms, which leads to indifference to the overall organizational
goals and cooperation with other units. Diverse social systems can emerge in different
units and this diversity can become an obstacle to the fulfillment of overarching
organizational goals. Ultimately, division of labor can affect the job satisfaction of
employees (Letterer, 1973; Thompson, 1961).
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Third, the division of labor leads to the complexity of organizational structure
(Blau, 1970). Child (1973) argued that specialization and expertise reflect organizational
complexity. Relatedly, structural complexity may lead to conflict among different
divisions or departments. Dalton and Watton (1967) asserted that task specialization can
lead to conflict as well as collaboration among different units because of (1) access to
limited resources; (2) differentiated status (power, prestige, etc.) and role dissatisfactions
in organizations; and (3) ambiguities of tasks and inadequate personal skill and traits.
Finally, the division of labor is associated with coordination within organizations.
The existence of specialized units may lead to conflicts (Mintzberg, 1979) or
interdependencies (March and Simon, 1958) among units. Accordingly, as specialization
within an organization increases, the necessity for the coordination and communication
among different subunits also increases (Blau, 1970; Mintzberg, 1979; Pfeffer, 1982;
Thompson, 1961). In fact, one of the reasons that the rate of structural differentiation of
formal organizations decelerates as size increases is the necessity of coordination among
different subunits (Blau, 1970).
Similarly, the increased division of labor also leads to the increased need for
administrative management and supervision (Blau, 1970; Mintzberg, 1979). In other
words, as the number of subunits within an organization increases, the organization needs
more structural mechanisms and personnel to take care of the conflicts and coordination
among different subunits. Critical administrative tools for coordination and management
of conflict among subunits are standardization and documentation of work process and
procedures (Child, 1973). That is, to prevent and solve the possible conflicts among
subunits, organizations tend to set up a standardized process describing tasks performed

21

by each subunit. This documentation ultimately leads to the increase of standardization of
organizations.

POLICE SPECIALIZED UNITS
Specialization marks one of the most common features of current police
organizations. In this section, I present research on specialized units within police
organizations, specifically focusing on the creation of specialized units because a new
addition (i.e., establishment of a separate unit) to organizational structure is a key
indicator of the level of police agencies’ specialization (Wilson, 1973).

POLICE SPECIALIZED UNITS
Reiss (1992) argued that due to bureaucratization, police departments in the
United Sates have undergone dramatic changes since the late 19th to early 20th centuries.
First, police departments became separated from the influence of local politicians.
Second, police agencies became hierarchical organizations, leading to an increased
number of staff officers. Third, police departments introduced merit systems in hiring and
promoting personnel. Last, and most closely related to this study, bureaucratization has
led to the complexity characterized by the growth of specialized units within police
agencies. In fact, Mastrofski and Willis (2010:69) asserted that the bureaucratization of
police organizations has led to “increased complexity in the form of the division of labor
among growing numbers of specialist units.”
Bureaucratization, however, is considered to include specialization. For instance,
Weber (1947:330) argued that “a specified sphere of competence” may be one of the key
characteristics of bureaucratic organizations:
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This involves (a) a sphere of obligations to perform functions that have been
marked off as part of a systematic division of labor. (b) The provision of the
incumbent with the necessary authority to carry out these functions. (c) That the
necessary means of compulsion are clearly defined and their use is subject to
definite conditions. A unit exercising authority which is organized in this way will
be called an ‘administrative organ.’

Thus, it may be tautological to suggest that bureaucratization led to the
specialization of police works. Because the goal of this study is not to dispute such
arguments, it may be enough to suggest that the aforementioned works clearly
substantiate the case that police departments have realized a high level of division of
labor since the late 19th century. Skogan and Frydl (2004:176) described the
specialization of police tasks as “one of the hallmarks of the professional or advanced
police organization.”
In one of the classics in police literature, Wilson (1968) posited that specialized
units can play a role in deciding whether police organizations would be likely to follow a
watchman, legalistic, or service style. Wilson (1968:155) stated that:
Having a minimum number of specialized or special-duty squads has an important
implication for organizational behavior: there will be few places to which one can
be transferred in the department and few incentives to seek transfer there.
(emphasis original)

In other words, specialized units are an organizational tool that makes police
officers behave differently by providing different career opportunities. Rather than riding
in a patrol vehicle for a long time, officers would work hard to get a “cushy” job in
another unit or division. In contrast, patrol officers do not have a reason to work hard if
there are not many career opportunities in specialized units. Wilson (1968:155) also
maintained that operation of specialized units can show the styles of police agencies: “an
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unspecialized department tends to be a watchman-like department that in turn tends to
resist specialization.” Walker and Katz (2012) similarly suggested that assignment to
specialized units is used by police administrators to give an opportunity to develop
officers’ careers within their organizations. According to this argument, specialization is
merely one of many personnel management tools.

CREATION OF SPECIALIZED UNITS
Why do police departments create specialized units? Is it critical or even
necessary for police agencies to have specialized units? Although the answers seem to be
obvious, these questions are important in understanding how police organizations
structure their agencies and how they function. Specifically, considering the
heterogeneity of police departments across the United States (Walker and Katz, 2010),
understanding the operational differences of specialized units among departments is
essential to paint a clear picture of how police perform their tasks in different
surroundings. For instance, Walker and Katz (1995) investigated how police departments
address bias crimes. Out of 16 police agencies, only four departments had separate bias
crimes units. Six agencies did not have units, while the remaining six departments had
specialized personnel or procedures to take care of bias crimes. In other words, agencies
take a different approach to tackle similar tasks. Thus, Walker and Katz (1995:33) argued
that:
Perhaps the most important factor related to the effective administration of a bias
crime unit is the real extent of a department’s commitment to the general problem
of bias crime enforcement as perceived by the officers assigned to the unit.
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It is also worth noting that earlier texts on police administration provide
normative explanations on this issue. That is, the old idea of a police officer as a
uniformed generalist suggests that a police officer should be able to address a wide
variety of issues rather than referring clients to specialized units in the organization. For
instance, Clift (1970:34) noted:
In evaluating specialization, it can neither be said that it is wholly bad or wholly
good. Certainly, some specialization must be carried on, especially when duties
can no longer be performed as a routine function. This is to say that we should
never specialize when generalization is possible.

Recently, numerous theoretical and empirical approaches have been taken to
explain why and how police departments create specialized units within their
organizations. One of the most prominent perspectives is rooted in institutional theory.
According to this approach, the establishment of specialized units within police
departments largely depends upon the availability of resources and willingness of police
organizations to portray themselves as crime fighters to satisfy external demands. Thus,
technical efficiency and effectiveness sometimes do not constitute the primary motivation
for establishing new specialized units (Maguire and King, 2007).
Crank and Langworthy (1992) utilized this perspective to explore the creation of
specialized police units. As predicted by institutional theory, police organizations create
specialized units to alleviate the pressure of external stakeholders who worry about crime
in the community, not from rational decision-making to increase efficiency and
effectiveness of organizational outputs. Thus, Crank and Langworthy (1992:344) argued
that:
The specialization itself is perceived by the sovereigns as essential to the “war
against crime.” That is, because of the influence of these sovereigns,
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organizational structure has elaborated in the direction of specialized crimefighting units.

There has been some empirical support for this institutional perspective. For
instance, Katz (2001) examined how and why police departments established gang units.
By testing institutional theory in explaining the establishment of gang units, Katz (2001:
65) argued that “various powerful elements within the community” drive police
organizations to set up separate gang units to tackle problems. For instance, the AfricanAmerican community supports police agencies’ decisions to operate gang units to address
the gang problems of African-American neighborhoods.
More importantly, Katz (2001) revealed that such gang specialty subunits
structured and operated their units based on the expectations of their institutional
environment rather than on effectiveness and efficiency. In other words, the activities and
structures of gang units follow the beliefs and expectation of members of police
organizations and external constituents. For instance, gang units form partnerships with
community groups, schools, and other criminal justice agencies, and by doing so, the
units maintain their legitimacy and gain support. In short, some specialized police units
are created not from rational decision-making by the police organization but as a
response to the external pressures to tackle community problems.
Maguire and Gantley (2009a) suggested that the creation of subunits is a metric of
an organization’s specialization. They proposed three reasons for establishing specialized
units (in this case, community policing units): (1) limited time to implement community
policing activities; (2) the influence of external funding; and (3) as a symbolic gesture to
demonstrate action to outsiders. Though based on observing specialization of community
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policing, these arguments can also be applied to other areas of policing. First, as the
demand for police attention to specific matters increases (e.g., gang activity, cyber-crime,
terrorism, etc.), agencies find that providing appropriate responses is difficult within
existing structures. Thus, police leaders decide to create discrete units with separate
personnel and resources to address new problems. Second, funding agencies tend to
provide financial assistance to agencies with specialized units (Maguire and Gantley,
2009a). Third, creation of a specialized unit sends a strong message to the community
that the police department is serious about the problems that the new unit was developed
to address.
Another study by Katz, Maguire, and Roncek (2002) examined factors that
affected the creation of gang units. This research was based on the assumption that
“police gang units represent a new and concentrated form of formal social control exerted
predominantly over young gang-aged males, often minorities” (Katz, Maguire, and
Roncek, 2002:492). They tested three distinct theories in explaining how and why police
agencies establish gang units: contingency, social threat, and resource dependency
theory. Their sample included 285 municipal police departments that had 100 or more
sworn officers. They found that variables related to contingency theory did not
significantly predict gang units (Katz, Maguire, and Roncek, 2002). That is, crime rates
were not predictive of the decision to create gang units. The percentage of Hispanics in
the population and the level of external funding were significant predictive factors. In
short, research shows that police departments create separate gang units from the
concerns of social threat in their communities rather than from the rational calculation of
criminal problems.

27

Giblin (2006) also explored the factors that affect the creation of crime analysis
units and found supporting evidence for Katz (2001) and Katz, Maguire, and Roncek
(2002): police agencies establish crime analysis units due to institutional factors. In
Giblin’s study, the institutional factor was the pressure of the Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. He also found that police department size
was positively correlated with crime analysis units (Giblin, 2006).

EFFECTS OF POLICE SPECIALIZED UNITS
One area that has not received much attention in the discussion of police
specialization is the effect of specialized units on organizational outputs. Researchers
have not provided a clear answer as to whether or not specialized police units change the
output of police organizations. Therefore, this study specifically focuses on the outputs,
not the outcomes, of specialized units.
Policing research has tended to look at outcomes of operations or program
implementation. While outputs refer to the completed products of an organization’s
activities, outcomes are desired goals that such programs intend to achieve. In other
words, “outcomes are not what the program itself did but the consequences of what the
program did” (Hatry, 2006:17, emphasis original). Reduced crime rates or increased
arrest rates can be some examples of outcomes resulting from increased foot patrol. In
this case, the coverage on foot patrol, amount of time spent on foot patrol, or number of
patrolling officers can be examples of outputs.
Again, this study is interested in whether the creation of specialized units affects
the outputs, i.e., the causal association between specialization and outputs. Understanding
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outputs can show the more direct and detailed consequence of specialized units within
police agencies. Simply looking at the outcomes of a program may exclude the possibility
that different outputs can lead to the same outcomes. Therefore, though a focus on
outputs may not reveal much regarding the achievement of organizational goals (Hatry,
2006), it surely helps us to identify how police agencies are different in program
implementation.
Some may take increased outputs for granted once specialized units are in
operation. Managers in charge of specialized units may want to produce as many outputs
as possible to meet the organizational expectation. Extra personnel or funding may be
available to produce multiple outputs. However, as Etzioni (1964:32) stated, “the highest
specialization is by no means the most efficient form of division of labor.” In other
words, specialization does not necessarily lead to the increase of outputs. For instance,
Decker (2007:732) suggested that organizational tension may lead to inefficiency in
producing intended outputs:
The challenges that face all specialized units . . . include avoiding isolation, a lack
of information sharing, an inability to penetrate community environments, the
lack of links to other enforcement and prosecution agencies, and in some cases,
the creation of conflict within the police organization and with the community.

Similarly, in one of the classic textbooks on police administration, Wilson (1973)
suggested a cautious establishment of specialized units. He argued that “specialized units
should be created only when overall departmental capability has significantly increased
and should not be created at the expense of reduced control and decreased general
interest.” Police practitioners have also raised concerns about the diffusion of specialized
units in police organizations. For instance, Staft (1980:7) maintained that increasing
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specialization can lead to numerous intra-organizational drawbacks, including
communication barriers and unnecessary competition:
As each subunit is created, additional communication problems develop. Subunits
are likely to become preoccupied with their own objectives instead of working
toward the agency’s overall goals, they may fail to volunteer assistance and
information to another subunit, or even worse, they may deliberately frustrate
efforts of competing subunits.

Research confirms the possibility that specialization may not necessarily lead to
the intended outputs. In a study comparing the work types between “patrol generalists”
and “community policing specialists,” Parks, Mastrofski, DeJong, and Gray (1999)
posited that specialists’ encounters with citizens are fewer than generalists’ interactions.
Based on observations of the two types of officers in Indianapolis and St. Petersburg,
Parks et al. argued that officers assigned to community policing spent more time with
paperwork and research than interacting with residents. However, the study was not clear
about whether community policing specialists were embedded in separate community
policing units.
Robinson and Chandek (2000) also examined whether community policing
assignment (i.e., specialization) affected the level of interaction between victims of
domestic violence and detectives and/or officers (i.e., outputs). Robinson and Chandek
(2000) tested the hypothesis that victims of domestic violence are more likely to
participate in formal criminal justice procedures (e.g., signing warrants) when the major
role of interacting officers is related to community policing. The rationale behind this
hypothesis is that victims may have more confidence in police practice when officers
were equipped with community policing beliefs. However, their analysis did not find
support for the hypothesis. Situational factors (e.g., presence of children, use of weapon,
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injury of victim, history of domestic violence complaints by victims, arrest at the scene,
etc.) affect the victims’ willingness to proceed with their cases formally, but whether or
not officers were from community policing units was not a statistically significant factor
in victims’ decisions to pursue their cases within the criminal justice system. Robinson
and Chandek additionally investigated the possibility that officers with community
policing obligations behave differently from other officers. The effect of specialized
units—in this case, community policing units—was not considered in the research.
A few researchers have examined the association between specialized units and
the extent to which the units were developed to achieve goals but not outputs. For
instance, Rutherford, Blevins, and Lord (2008) examined the direct effect of a street
crime unit on citizens’ fear of crime. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department in
North Carolina created a street crimes unit to address increasing robberies and other
serious crimes in 2005. Rutherford et al. evaluated the effectiveness of the newly
established specialized unit on citizens’ fear of crime after six months. They found no
statistically significant relationship between the two, but citizens did report perceiving an
increased police presence on the street. Rutherford et al. concluded that creation of the
street crime unit was not effective.
While examining the major issues involved in community policing
implementation, Vito, Walsh, and Kunselman (2005) argued that one obstacle in
implementing community policing is the presence of specialized community policing
units. Based on a survey of 68 middle managers in 44 police departments across the
United States, they revealed that separate units hinder communication among officers
from different units and divisions. Thus, philosophy and specific programs in facilitating
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community policing are not shared organization-wide but are limited to officers in an
“innovation ghetto” (Vito, Walsh, and Kunselman, 2005:502). Key issues surrounding
conflict and coordination among specialized units were presented. These authors did not
provide any evidence whether specialized community policing units were effective and/or
efficient in producing outputs. Rather, their research mostly offered the opinions and
perceptions of mid-level supervisors in police departments.

SUMMARY
Police organizations are becoming increasingly specialized. But despite the
significance of division of labor, not much research has investigated how police agencies
divide their roles and how division of police labor has an effect on police outputs. Some
studies explored how and why police organizations set up specialized units. However, the
effect that such units have on police outputs has been largely ignored. Researchers have
not investigated the association between the creation of specialized units and their
achievement of intended goals. For instance, does creation of cyber-crime units increase
arrests for cyber-crime? Do police organizations arrest more gang member after agencies
set up new gang units? Does the creation of internal affairs units increase the detection of
problematic officers? Do police departments implement more community policing
programs if they operate separate community policing units? These questions remain
unanswered in spite of increased empirical attention upon the topic of police
specialization.
Researchers interested in studying the structure of police departments have
investigated specialization as only one of numerous components of police organizations
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(Skogan and Frydl, 2004). That is, the specific effect of specialization has not been
disentangled from bureaucracy or other concepts of organizational structure
(Langworthy, 1986; Maguire 2003). When researchers have investigated specialized
units, the focus often has been on the process by which such units were created. Thus,
studies have ignored how the establishment of specialized units directly affects police
department activities (i.e., organizational outputs). This argument is summarized in
Figure 2.1. Prior research has focused on the links between organizational and
environmental factors and the creation of police specialized units (A). However, the
association between the establishment of such units and organizational outputs (B) has
not been explored.

Figure 2.2. The Proposed Causal Relationship between Police Units and Outputs

In this dissertation, the creation of community policing units and their intended
effect on agencies’ outputs is a focus of study. More specifically, I will examine whether
police organizations’ outputs of community policing differ depending on the existence of
specialized community policing units. The following chapter provides a brief
introduction to community policing, including its core elements and the reason why
community policing units have been selected in discussing the effect of specialization
within police departments.

33

CHAPTER 3. COMMUNITY POLICING AND POLICE
ORGANIZATION

The issue of specialization has become more complex since police organizations
began to embrace the community policing philosophy in the 1970s. Unlike advocates of
traditional policing tactics, community policing proponents encourage police
organizations to adopt different approaches in terms of structuring organizations, relating
to their local communities, and tackling local problems. Specifically, the community
policing approach has an important relevance in this research insofar as it calls for less
specialization within police departments. I start with a brief introduction of the
community policing approach. Next, I discuss key elements of community policing and
specialization within the context of community policing. Finally, I posit research
questions for this study.

COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES
Now a major aspect of American policing, community policing developed from
the changing relationship between police departments and society. Since the early 20th
century, police reformers have attempted to prevent corruption and to control officers’
behavior on the street. This “professional model” highlighted reactive strategies that
focus on quick response to calls for service and crime fighting on the street (Moore,
1992). Historically, police departments were characterized by homogeneity of
organizational structures and strategies. That is, although police agencies faced different
problems in diverse contexts, most police departments relied on strategies that
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emphasized the importance of catching criminals and, after widespread availability of the
telephone in homes, responding to citizens’ calls as quickly as possible (Mastrofski and
Willis, 2010).
Such efforts, combined with technological developments (specifically, the
introduction of motorized patrol), have contributed to the isolation of the police from the
public (Greene, 2000). Community cooperation to prevent and solve crime was hard to
obtain (Walker and Katz, 2010). Therefore, since the 1970s an increasing number of
police departments have adopted the community policing philosophy in an attempt to be
more accessible to and in better communication with community members. The
establishment of a federal agency—i.e., the Community Oriented Policing Services—has
also contributed to the widespread diffusion of this new approach (Mastrofski and Willis,
2010).
This new approach in policing has been hailed as an alternative to traditional
policing tactics (Walker and Katz, 2010). In contrast to the traditional approach, the new
community policing perspective starts from the premise that because communities have
their own unique problems and situations, different strategies need to be developed and
implemented accordingly (Moore, 1992). Specifically, community policing demands that
police agencies take citizens’ concerns and needs into account in their daily policing
activities. Thus, community policing considers community as a co-producer of police
services as well as a recipient, not as a target of policing tactics (Moore, 1992; Skogan,
2004).
The federal government has poured unprecedented resources into implementing
community policing in local police departments across the United States and community
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policing has been regarded as “the most widely adopted police innovation” during the
1990s (Weisburd and Eck, 2004: 46). Greene (2000: 301) even argued that community
policing “has become the national mantra of the American police.” The popularity and
prevalence of community policing by police departments has continued to grow in recent
years (Cordner, 2004; Eck and Maguire, 2000; Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000).
Community policing can be implemented in different ways in sheriffs’
departments and municipal police departments. As briefly mentioned above, local police
departments in the United States are characterized by high levels of heterogeneity in
terms of operations, personnel management, and priorities in daily policing. Significant
differences exist between sheriffs’ departments and municipal police departments in
leadership formation. For instance, the chiefs of sheriffs’ departments are traditionally
elected by their residents, whereas the head of municipal police departments are typically
appointed by elected officials. Also, the former are directly involved in all facets of the
criminal justice system (i.e., police, court, and correction), while municipal tasks are
generally limited to policing (Skogan and Frydl, 2004).
Not surprisingly, the way community policing is implemented may not be the
same in sheriffs’ departments relative to large municipal police departments. LaFrance
and Placide (2010) argued that the chiefs in sheriffs’ and municipal police departments
have different attitudes and relationships with board members in their local governments.
While sheriffs demonstrated keen interest in working together with their counterparts in
the local governing body, police chiefs in municipal police departments did not.
Considering that sheriffs are elected by their residents and police chiefs are appointed by
local politicians, this difference may not be surprising. Similarly, Falcone and Wells
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(1995) maintained that sheriff’s department personnel are not exempt from the concern of
their sheriff’s re-election. Thus, officers in sheriff’s departments may be more sensitive to
citizens’ interests and satisfaction in community policing programs.
Another key issue in community policing is that policing scholars do not agree
upon what the new approach entails in theory and in practice, or even exactly how to
classify it. Some regard it as “operational approaches” (e.g., Moore, 1992) or a “new
style of policing” (Greene, 2000), while others consider it as “a variety of philosophical
and practical approaches” (Community Policing Consortium, 1994).
The lack of consensus regarding what is included in community policing has been
problematic for practitioners as well. For instance, as will be discussed below, according
to many advocates, one of the key elements in community policing is despecialization
(Greene, 2000). That is, there is a strong trend in the community policing movement to
argue that police agencies should attempt to make officers generalists so that all officers
can engage in community policing activities (see Maguire and Gantley, 2009a). In some
cases, however, creation of specialized units has been regarded as part of community
policing efforts. For instance, Weisel and Shelley (2004) argued that specialized gang
units in the Indianapolis Police and the San Diego Police Departments
function as part of community policing and problem-solving approaches. That is, gang
units in these two police agencies increased inter- and intra-agency partnership and
collaboration with community members to combat gang problems. Also, analysis and
provision of gang-related data was critical in tackling gang issues. In short, Weisel and
Shelley maintained that gang units can be used as an organizational structure that
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complements community policing efforts by providing resources to combat gang
problems.
Therefore, critically reviewing the components of community policing is
important in understanding the effects of specialized units. Without close examination of
community policing activities implemented by police agencies, suggesting that such
activities affect numerous outcomes (e.g., reduction of crime, fear of crime, or calls for
service) may be misleading (Wilson, 2004). Thus, it has to be kept in mind that
community policing activities can include diverse programs even though police agencies
promote them under the single banner of community policing. This confusion is one of
the key reasons why it is essential to look into the components of community policing.

KEY ELEMENTS OF COMMUNITY POLICING PROGRAMS
A few researchers have attempted to uncover the elements of community policing.
However, theoretical and empirical studies on the dimensionality reveal mixed results
(see Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000). Still, investigation of key elements of community
policing is essential for several reasons. First, investigators have tended to examine
different policing tactics as if they are the same, simply because the tactics were
implemented under the theme of “community policing” (Moore, 1994). For instance,
some police departments may prioritize and promote the organizational aspects of
community policing, while other agencies may encourage partnerships within the local
communities. If the two distinct activities are branded as simply community policing
activities, we lose a lot of information in investigating them as either independent or
dependent variables. Thus, community policing can be criticized for being a “hodge-
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podge” of desirable programs (Crank and Langworthy, 1996) or a “potpourri” of
numerous strategies (Maguire and King, 2004).
Second, empirical studies have used different criteria in evaluating the
effectiveness of community policing programs. For instance, Chappell, MacDonald, and
Manz (2006) constructed community-oriented policing and problem-oriented policing
variables from numerous items. No clear explanation, however, was provided as to their
conceptual basis (see also MacDonald, 2002). Such inconsistency and lack of standards
hinder our understanding of how community policing programs are executed and what
affects the successful implementation of these programs.
Consequently, by separating community policing programs into distinct
dimensions or elements, we can better understand the factors that affect their
implementation. Therefore, this research relies on the categorization of community
policing by Fridell (2004). She suggested three elements or “essential efforts” of
community policing: (1) community engagement; (2) problem-solving; and (3)
organizational transformation.
Several other policing scholars have proposed similar elements of community
policing with slightly different terms. For instance, Walker and Katz (2010) proposed
three characteristics of community policing: (1) community engagement; (2)
organizational change; and (3) problem-solving. Somewhat similarly, Mastrofski and
Willis (2010) also provided three distinct elements: (1) community engagement in
making policies and delivering services; (2) embracing problem-oriented policing
approaches; and (3) organizational decentralization. Additionally, Maguire and Wells
(2009) suggested three dimensions of community policing: (1) problem-solving; (2)
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community engagement; and (3) organizational adaptation. I will adopt the three key
elements proposed by Fridell (2004)—community engagement, problem-solving, and
organizational transformation—and elaborate on them below.

(1) Community Engagement in Policing
Community engagement refers to active participation by citizens and local groups
in crime prevention and the development of police strategies. Traditionally, police
departments were regarded as the sole provider of policing service. Police organizations
had the full responsibility for implementing strategies to tackle local problems (e.g.,
crime, gangs, and disorder, etc.) and have taken the blame for the failure of keeping their
communities safe. However, scholars as well as practitioners now realize that community
safety cannot be maintained entirely by police departments (Bayley, 1994).
In addition, police and the public tend to have different priorities in identifying
the problems of their communities. Police traditionally have focused on tackling crime,
but community members place more emphasis on reducing the fear of crime, keeping
peace in public places, and following democratic procedures in enforcing the law (Moore,
1992). Thus, community policing proponents argue that police departments need to
develop strategies based on “the public’s definition of its own problems” (Skogan
2004:160). To achieve this goal, cooperation and partnership with community members
and groups has been strongly encouraged and citizen engagement in developing and
implementing policies is central in community policing.
Specifically, Fridell (2004) suggested the following factors as community
engagement elements:
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(1) increase of “interaction and familiarity” with community members
(2) partnership formation with community groups

First, police can increase interaction with community members in a number of
ways. For instance, police agencies can provide foot and bike patrol and hold community
meetings to communicate with their constituents. Also, police departments can operate a
citizen police academy or other outreach programs, like Police Athletic Leagues and
citizen volunteer programs. These special programs enable citizens to become more
familiarized with police work as well as provide information on their communities to the
police.
Second, police departments strive to form close partnerships with local
community groups (public or private). Partnerships with diverse community groups play
an important role in the delivery of police service. In fact, a close partnership with
community members is “the watchword” in community policing programs (Greene,
2000). Many community problems and concerns raised by citizens (e.g., vacant houses
and dirty streets filled with litter) cannot be solved solely by the police. To cooperate and
partner with other public agencies is critical in addressing many issues, yet has been also
one of the most challenging parts of community policing efforts (Skogan, 2004).

(2) Introduction of the Problem-Solving Approach
The problem-solving approach means that police departments focus on the root
causes of crime problems, rather than simply responding to calls for services (Goldstein,
1987). Thus, the problem-solving approach requires police officers to think more
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proactively about the issues in their neighborhoods. Officers start to investigate what lies
beneath residents’ repeated complaints and calls for service. More specifically, Fridell
(2004) suggested that the problem-solving approach consists of the following two
elements:
(1) implementation of problem-solving tactics; and
(2) support for problem-solving through training, performance measurement,
and other tools

First, one of the key elements in community policing is that officers need to take a
creative approach in addressing local problems. Rather than repeatedly responding to
similar incidents caused by the same underlying conditions, police need to gather data,
develop strategies, implement them, and evaluate the tactics (Goldstein, 1987).
Specifically, police take the SARA approach in solving local problems: Scanning,
Analysis, Response, and Assessment (Walker and Katz, 2010). Scanning refers to the
observation of local problems by the police. Police then try to figure out the problems and
underlying causes in the Analysis step. Response means a implementation of a program to
tackle the identified problems. Finally, police evaluate their program strategy in the
Assessment stage. By taking this proactive approach, officers can develop creative
strategies to deal with local problems.
Second, police departments have to support officers in developing a problemsolving approach. Officers need to be trained in “recognizing patterns of incidents”
(Skogan, 2004:161), and their performance needs to be evaluated. Police agencies must
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invest more resources in training, performance measures, and evaluation to increase
officers’ problem-solving capabilities.

(3) Organizational Transformation
Traditionally, police organizations have been reluctant to change. Specifically,
studies have found that many field officers are unwilling to be involved in community
policing activities (see Maguire and Gantley, 2009b). Community policing officers are
sometimes called “empty holster guys” (Skogan, 2004) and are ridiculed by their peers
for not doing “real police work.” These phrases show that changing the perspective of
officers and organizational philosophy can be a daunting task. Put differently, the
resistance of officers reveals how important it is for police departments to train officers
and thereby change perspectives. Thus, organizational transformation is not just about
structural change but also agency-wide support for community policing and the problemsolving approach (Fridell, 2004) through:
(1) development of plans and training that include a community policing
philosophy;
(2) reducing the levels of management within police departments; and
(3) physical decentralization of patrol officers and detectives.

First, plans or policies do effectively change the behavior of police, and previous
studies also describe the role of official plans in implementing community policing
(Skogan, 2006). In fact, many proponents of community policing maintain that the effort
should be an agency-wide philosophy rather than newly developed strategies (e.g.,
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Maguire, 1997). Also, training for members involved in community policing is critical
(Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1998) not only because training can provide relevant
skills and tactics necessary to implement the new strategy but also because training sends
a signal to the trainees that police managers are serious about the new approach (Skogan
and Hartnett, 1997).
Second, police agencies need to change their organizational structure so that field
officers are free of bureaucratic hurdles in implementing community policing programs.
Community policing supporters claim that traditional organizational management can
play a negative role by compromising constructive interactions between police and
communities (Greene, 2000). Mid- and upper-level managers are comfortable with the
status quo because their authority is already established in the traditional organizational
structure (Skogan, 2004). Thus, “pushing power downward in the agency” is another key
element of community policing (Fridell, 2004:8). Police agencies need to devolve
decision-making powers to line officers so that officers themselves can identify
community problems and develop tactics to address such problems (Cordner, 2001;
Fridell, 2004; Skolnick and Bayley, 1988).
Last, physical decentralization of officers enables them to interact with
community members more closely (Fridell, 2004:8). Police departments can create substations, mini-stations, precinct stations, or store fronts and put officers at such sites. By
doing so, police can be more accessible to citizens and officers can be more familiar with
the pressing issues and problems of the local area. In short, geographic decentralization
of officers “change[s] the working environment, fostering creative thinking, innovation,
and strong commitment to solving problems” (Maguire and Gantley, 2009b).
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SPECIALIZED COMMUNITY POLICING UNITS
As shown above, the three elements of community policing posit that the new
approach needs to be embraced and implemented agency-wide. Thus, creation of
specialized community policing units may be ironic in a community policing era. The
philosophy of community policing calls for generalized (not specialized) police officers
so that every officer can be involved in close interactions with citizens and problemsolving activities. However, the creation of specialized units committed to community
policing strategies may signify that officers in the units are mainly responsible for the
implementation of diverse community policing programs (Moore, 1992).
If specialized community policing units are loosely coupled with other aspects of
organizational structure, such units are likely to experience difficulties in performing
diverse community policing programs (Webb and Katz, 2003). Community policing
programs demand collaboration among diverse functional units. Therefore, if community
policing units are not linked or connected with other organizational configurations, the
units can undergo huge challenges due to isolation, lack of interaction with other
organizational members, or even indifference and hostility (Webb and Katz, 2003).
Nevertheless, research has been relatively silent on why police leaders decide to
establish separate community policing units. In fact, as shown above, a study by Maguire
and Gantley (2009a) is one of only a few that has examined the role of community
policing units. Investigating community policing activities revealed that 8 out of 12
police departments had specialized community policing units (Maguire and Gantley,
2009a). In addition, variability existed among police organizations regarding the way in
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which community policing activities were structured by the individual agencies. Three
models were identified: specialized, generalized, and hybrid models.
In the specialized model, police departments perform community policing through
separate units specifically devoted to program implementation. As revealed above, police
administrators opt for specialized models because of availability of funding, officers’ lack
of interest, and the symbolic value of specialized units. In contrast, in generalized
models, police departments try to implement community policing in an agency-wide
manner in which all officers engage in community policing activities. Most community
policing supporters think of this model as ideal even though agencies using this approach
are often faced with difficulties in adopting the generalized model due in part to the
limited understanding of officers and lack of time and resources. Hybrid models are
found where police organizations start to move from specialized to generalized models
(Maguire and Gantley, 2009a).
In short, the presence of separate community policing units reveals the conflict
between the ideal and the reality of a new approach (Weisel and Shelley, 2004). Creation
of specialized units to implement community policing is antithetical to the core principles
that such units are supposed to keep. Even so, it has become an empirical question to
investigate the roles and beneficial effects of specialized community policing units
because of their widespread use within contemporary police agencies.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As shown above, research generally has ignored the possibility that differences in
outputs may exist across agencies with different models, and few researchers have
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investigated whether agencies maintain one specific model in implementing community
policing programs. Given this context, the goals of this dissertation are twofold: (1) to
investigate the conditions under which community policing units are created within
police departments; and (2) to study the effect of community policing units on the
implementation of community policing programs. Specifically, this research addresses
two significant questions:

1. Have police agencies increased (or decreased) community policing units over time?
Specialized community policing units were examined to track whether police
agencies change structure over time. That is, what is the scope of specialized police units
in the United States? To assess specialization in American policing, the research
measured the extent to which specialized community policing units have increased in
American police organizations in recent years. By describing changes in separate
community policing units, the patterns of specialization within police agencies can be
identified.
Structural change was used as a key independent variable in this research.
Community policing scholars have maintained that police agencies need to despecialize
their organizations. However, not much is known about whether despecialization has
actually occurred in police departments. As an important component of community
policing, the operation of specialized units will reveal whether police organizations have
increased or decreased their division of labor.
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2. How does creation of community policing units affect the outputs in community
policing program?
Studies measuring organizational success or effectiveness have used rate of crime,
disorder, and other law enforcement activities as key dependent variables (e.g., Maguire
and Uchida, 2000; Mastrofski and Willis, 2010), but not much research has examined
community policing activities as a dependent variable. As shown above, community
policing programs are oftentimes used as an explanatory variable to measure their effect
on crime or fear of crime. The effect of organizational structures on police activity
outcomes has not been extensively studied (Mastrofski and Willis, 2010). That is, the
causal mechanism between organizational structure changes and the resulting efficacy of
police activities has been largely ignored.
Therefore, this study examined the effect of structural change on the
implementation of community policing activities. More specifically, the research tracked
whether establishing new community policing units tends to improve the outcomes of
community policing activities. Community policing programs were divided into three
distinct elements, and these three elements were used as dependent variables.
Although only a few studies have empirically tested such dimensionality,
elements, or subcategories of community policing activities, different dimensions have
been identified by researchers (e.g., Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000). How police
departments choose—and, often, mix—their community policing strategies requires
further investigation. Specifically, identifying the variation in community policing
elements is important for two reasons. First, without investigating the differences in
police departments’ community policing dimensions, making generalizations becomes
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difficult (Cordner, 1995). For instance, two different agencies that claim that they are
implementing community policing may actually have two radically different approaches
(e.g., one may focus on geographic reallocation of officers while the other may focus on
personnel training).
Second, it is worthwhile to test whether organizational and environmental factors
have a similar effect on different elements of community policing. Local police
departments have obtained enormous external funding to implement community policing,
but not many researchers have examined how such financial assistance has been put to
use by police agencies (Wilson, 2004). For the funding agencies, it may be imperative to
look at the specifics of community policing programs to check the proper management of
resources and to ensure financial responsibility (Kennedy, 1993). Therefore, the current
study grouped numerous community policing activities into three broader dimensions and
treated those dimensions as outcome variables. Organizational and environmental factors
were studied to explain the variations in such dimensions.
Moreover, different types of police agencies do not necessarily operate in similar
patterns, including implementation of community policing activities. Thus, this
dissertation will investigate whether differences in community policing activities exist
between sheriffs’ departments and municipal police departments. The model is presented
in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. The Model of the Current Study
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This chapter provided a brief overview of community policing. Key elements or
dimensions of community policing were addressed. The chapter concluded by proposing
research questions centered on the causal linkage between the creation of community
policing units on the implementation of community policing programs and their outputs.
The next chapter describes the data, methods, and statistical techniques used to examine
these questions.
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CHAPTER 4. DATA AND METHODS
Many policing scholars have lamented the lack of longitudinal studies on police
organizations (e.g., Mastrofski and Willis, 2010). Few studies have looked into the
factors that may play a role in restructuring police organizations over time (Maguire,
2002). To examine the change of outputs and factors affecting such change in police
agencies, I used the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics
(LEMAS), which will be described in detail below. Because I used multiple waves of the
LEMAS, I will describe how I merged three waves into a single dataset. Also, I will
specify how variables included in the analyses were constructed. Elements of community
policing activities were selected as dependent variables, and I provide the rationale for
variable construction. The presence or absence of a specialized community policing unit
is a key independent variable, so I will show how the variable was constructed as well as
other control variables.
The merged dataset consists of time series cross-sectional or panel data.
Therefore, a linear panel analysis model was used to test the effect of community
policing units on police organizations’ community policing activities. Finally, this
chapter concludes by presenting the method of analysis and the justification for the
statistical model employed.

DATA
THE LEMAS
Because this study is focused on police operational processes (i.e., creation of
community policing units) and outputs, the unit of analysis is the individual police
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agency. Dependent variables and the organizational aspect of independent variables were
derived from the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS).
The LEMAS is a sample survey of United States law enforcement agencies and was
developed out of the recognition that there was not enough data to study police
organizations compared to other elements of the American criminal justice system
(Maguire and Uchida, 2000). Thus, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) developed the
LEMAS and administered it for the first time in 1987. Since then, BJS has conducted the
LEMAS survey every three or four years: 1990, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2007. The
LEMAS includes questions about organizational structures, personnel, operations,
budgets and pay, technology, and facilities (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011).
The LEMAS includes federal, state, and tribal agencies. However, the roles,
operations, and organizational characteristics of federal and state police agencies are
different from those of municipal and county sheriff’s departments (Cordner and
Scarborough, 1999). For example, roles and responsibilities of federal agencies are
determined by federal legislation and do not include “the ambiguous and difficult order
maintenance” tasks and other peace-keeping activities for local residents (Walker and
Katz, 2010). Also, the function of state police agencies differs from that of municipal and
county sheriff’s departments. While the former is generally restricted to highway patrol
and support for small police departments’ crime investigation, the latter focuses on
interactions with residents and responding to calls for services (Walker and Katz, 2010).
Specifically, the discussion of community policing has been focused on local
police departments—either municipal police departments or county sheriff’s
departments—with good reasons. Relative to federal and state police agencies, local
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police departments have more room for developing and implementing community
policing programs, which is due in part to the proximity to residents and local knowledge
(Cordner and Scarborough, 1999).
For this research, only municipal police departments and sheriff departments were
selected. Thus, municipal police and sheriff’s department that participated in any one of
the three waves of LEMAS from 2000 and 2007 were included in the dataset. Table 4.1
shows the number of cases (i.e., municipal and sheriff’s departments) before and after
data construction. The left side of the table shows the number of police agencies in each
wave of the LEMAS. As will be shown below, agencies that participated in all three
waves were selected for further analysis to identify changes and factors affecting these
changes. Thus, the right side of the Table 4.1 shows the final cases included for the
analysis. In total, 641 departments were included in the analyses.2

Table 4.1. Samples in the LEMAS and in the Dataset of this Study
LEMAS

Organization Type

Frequency (%)

Dataset

Frequency (%)

2000

Sheriff’s Dept.

881 (32.2)

2000

Municipal Police Dept.

1857 (67.8)

2003

Sheriff’s Dept.

359 (32.2)

Sheriff’s Dept.

198 (30.9)

2003

Municipal Police Dept.

756 (67.8)

Municipal Police Dept.

443 (69.1)

2007

Sheriff’s Dept.

348 (32.6)

2007

Municipal Police Dept.

721 (67.4)

2

Data for the two subgroups Sheriff’s Departments and Municipal Police Departments were subjected to
two separate analyses. I discuss the rationale behind this decision in Method of Analysis section.
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PANEL DATA (TIME SERIES CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA)
Three waves of LEMAS data from 2000 to 2007 were merged. Specifically, the
dataset compiled from the above process is time series cross-sectional (TSCS) or panel
data. That is, local law enforcement agencies (i.e., municipal police and county sheriff’s
departments) that participated in all three waves of the LEMAS were selected and
longitudinal datasets were constructed by assembling three waves of cross-sectional
datasets. Therefore, each police organization included in the dataset (n=1, 2, . . . , N) was
observed at three periods (t=1, 2, and 3) with several variables (k=1, 2, . . . , K). The
TSCS data structure is regarded as the standard format that can then permit more
advanced analyses (Menard, 2002).
One of the challenges in the utilization of the LEMAS for longitudinal research is
the discrepancy of questions across waves of data. When the same content area was
measured, the questions were sometimes asked differently. It may not be surprising to
find such inconsistency, considering that the main purpose of the LEMAS survey is to
provide a description of U.S. police agencies and not to investigate the organizational
changes or causal relationships. In fact, it is not uncommon to face such challenges
within longitudinal data, especially collected by government agencies (Menard, 2002).
Despite such variations, many consistencies are maintained across different waves
of data. For instance, the number of personnel—sworn officers or civilian personnel—is
one of questions that the LEMAS consistently asks police agencies. Fortunately for the
purpose of this study, the items included in the community policing section reveal
considerable similarities. Thus, it is possible to follow changes in police organizational
structure and activities when the same items are included in several waves of data.
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Moreover, the LEMAS is a useful source of data to answer the research questions of this
study because it includes information both on structure (community policing units) and
outputs (community policing program implementation) of police departments.
Furthermore, the factors that may have affected such changes can also be
identified using two or more waves of data, as well as other sources of data. In other
words, longitudinal analyses are possible once several datasets are matched. However,
due to these differences across the LEMAS, using the LEMAS surveys for longitudinal
analyses of certain topics must be done cautiously (Menard, 2002).
Due to question overlap in the LEMAS, a few prior studies have set the precedent
of merging several LEMAS datasets to examine causal mechanisms between
organizational factors and outcomes of police agencies. For instance, Wells and Falcone
(2005) merged the LEMAS 1997 and 1999 along with the Uniform Crime Report and
other socioeconomic datasets. Also, Roberts and Roberts (2006) used three waves of the
LEMAS data to investigate the association between network ties and their effect on
innovation by police agencies. This present study also merged three waves of the
LEMAS, including the most recent waves of data (i.e., LEMAS 2007). The compiled
dataset for the analysis went through several steps; the complete process is shown in
Appendix 1.
It is worth noting that the way dependent variables were constructed in this study
is not the same for 2000-2003 and 2003-2007 data analyses. As mentioned earlier, items
included in community policing sections changed slightly from wave to wave. Therefore,
I decided to construct two different sets of dependent variables to keep as much
information as possible. In short, I conducted two separate analyses (i.e., Analysis I and
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Analysis II). The structure of the merged dataset—pooling or stacking multi-wave data—
is shown in Table 4.2. This structure is the most common framework for panel analysis
(Finkel, 2008; Menard, 2002).

Table 4.2. Structure of the Dataset
Variable 1:
X1
Analysis I

Variable 2:
X2

TIME 1
(2000)

...

PD 1
X111
X112
PD 2
X211
X212
…
PD N
XN11
XN12
TIME 2 PD 1
X121
X122
(2003)
PD 2
X221
X222
…
PD N
XN21
XN22
Analysis II TIME 1 PD 1
X121
X122
(2003)
PD 2
X221
X222
…
PD N
XN21
XN22
TIME 2 PD 1
X131
X132
(2007)
PD 2
X231
X232
…
PD N
XN31
XN32
Note: Adapted from Menard (2002). Longitudinal Research, 2nd ed.

Variable K:
XK

Dependent
Variable Y1

X11K
X21K

Y11
Y21

XN1K
X12K
X22K

YN1
Y12
Y22

XN2K
X12K
X22K

YN2
Y12
Y22

XN2K
X13K
X23K

YN2
Y13
Y23

XN3K

YN3

Constructing TSCS data from multiple waves of the LEMAS is beneficial to
understand the changes and the cause of changes in police operations, specifically
considering the cost involved in conducting longitudinal research. As Menard (2002:80)
argued, longitudinal analysis is “ultimately indispensable” in investigating changes across
time and the factors attributable to such changes. In fact, prior research has taken a
similar approach to examine the change of police outputs and their association with
organizational factors. For instance, He, Zhao, and Lovrich (2005) used three waves of
longitudinal data gathered by the Division of Governmental Studies and Services at
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Washington State University from 1993 to 2000. He et al. compiled the datasets to
produce panel data. The approach taken by this research is somewhat similar to that of He
et al. (2005). However, the samples in the study by He et al. (2005) were limited to
medium to large municipal police agencies, resulting in less than 200 departments. Also,
specialization of police agencies was not considered as a factor related to community
policing programs. Dependent variables also differ between that study and the present
study.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Dimensions of Community Policing
The dependent variables are three dimensions or elements of community policing
activities, or program implementation (i.e., outputs of community policing). As discussed
in Chapter 3, Fridell (2004) asserted that community policing includes three key
elements: community engagement, problem-solving, and organizational transformation.
Each wave of the LEMAS used in this study has a separate community policing section
that includes questions about activities implemented by police departments (i.e., policy,
training of personnel, problem-solving activities, partnership formation, and conducting
surveys). Most questions in this section reflect one of the dimensions of community
policing.
Hence, I took the items of the LEMAS in the community policing section that
reflected each element of community policing and grouped them into three dimensions
based on the typology by Fridell (2004). If the items were categorical, they were recoded
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into binary variables for consistency of data. The following three items were recoded
through this dichotomization.
First, in the LEMAS 2000, one question asked, “As of June 30, 2000, did your
agency have a community policing plan?” Three different categories—i.e., (1) “Yes,
formally written,” (2) “Yes, not formally written,” and (3) “No”—were presented in the
survey. The same question, however, was asked in a slightly different manner in 2003
and 2007. For instance, in the LEMAS 2003, the survey asked whether the agency
“maintained or created a formal, written community policing plan,” and the survey
participants were able to mark either “Yes” or “No.” Thus, I recoded the (1) “Yes,
formally written” group into “Yes.” Two other groups (i.e., (2) “Yes, not formally
written,” and (3) “No”) were recoded into “No.” Some information may be lost due to
this decision, but the recoding is justifiable considering that I kept the consistency of
contents across three waves of data.
Second, in the LEMAS 2000 through 2007, items on community policing training
for newly-recruited officers asked, “ During the 12-month period ending June 30, what
proportion of agency personnel received at least eight hours of community policing
training (problem-solving, SARA, community partnerships, etc.)?” Four different
categories—“all,” “half or more,” “less than half,” and “none”—were presented for the
agencies to mark. I recoded this item into a dichotomous variable: training all officers or
not. If agencies trained all officers, they were recoded as “Yes,” and if not, “No.”
As noted above, personnel training on community policing is a key factor in
changing organization members’ attitudes toward community policing. Training sends a
strong message to officers and civilian personnel that their departments are serious about
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implementing community policing programs. Thus, agencies that train all officers may be
different from those that provide training to only a portion of officers. In addition, the
composite score can reduce skewness by dichotomizing the item (Osgood, McMorris,
and Potenza, 2002). Prior research also used the same coding scheme (e.g., Chappell et
al., 2006). Last, the same question on training was asked for in-service personnel and I
recoded it into a dichotomous variable for the same reason as mentioned earlier.
After assigning items in each dimension based on the criteria of Fridell (2004), an
additive scale of each dimension was calculated by summating dichotomized indicators
in the questions to serve as dependent variables. Calculating a composite score from
multiple-item data is not uncommon in social science research (Osgood et al., 2002). In
fact, in addition to producing a dependent variable suitable for diverse statistical methods,
researchers can make the most of information by summating items. Also, summative
scaling can reduce the influence of an idiosyncratic score that may only be relevant to a
certain item, thus improving the reliability of measures (Osgood et al., 2002).
All items included in each dimension were binary items. Therefore, factor
analysis was not appropriate in identifying dimensions of community policing because
factor analysis assumes metrical values of binary data (Bartholomew, Steele, Moustaki,
and Galbraith, 2008).
As discussed earlier, inconsistencies of survey questions exist across the three
datasets. For instance, items on lists of groups that police agencies met with regularly are
not the same (e.g., “domestic violence groups” was included only in 2000). In addition,
as for the items on police agencies’ conducting surveys, the LEMAS 2007 used
“conducted or sponsored a survey of citizens on crime, fear of crime, or satisfaction with
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police services.” However, in the LEMAS 2000 and 2003, the same content was split into
three separate items so that police agencies could choose one of three components. More
details are discussed in each section of community policing elements. Therefore,
decisions were made regarding item selection. How the three elements of community
policing were constructed from the items in the LEMAS is described below.

(1) Community Engagement
As Fridell (2004) noted, community engagement elements of community policing
activities involve close interaction with community members and groups. Thus, three
items in the LEMAS were included in the community engagement element of community
policing: (1) Having a citizen police academy program; (2) Training citizens in
community policing; and (3) Partnering with local groups to solve crime problems. The
exact items included in this element are shown in Table 4.3.
As mentioned above, some discrepancies of questions regarding community
engagement exist among the three waves of the LEMAS. First, the citizen police
academy item is included in all three waves of the LEMAS from 2000 to 2007. However,
citizen training in community policing was not included as an option in the LEMAS
2007. Also, a question on partnership formation in the LEMAS 2000 asks “. . . which of
the following groups did your agency meet with regularly (at least once every 3 months)
to address crime-related problems?” Following this, ten different types of community
groups were listed. In the LEMAS 2003 and 2007, the question was slightly changed into
“. . . did your agency have a problem-solving partnership or written agreement with any
of the following?” Following this, nine and eight community groups were provided
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respectively. Table 4.3 presents the description of community engagement elements of
questions included in the LEMAS 2000 through 2007.

Table 4.3. Description of Community Engagement Element in the LEMAS (20002007)
2000

2003

2007

Conducting a citizen police
academy: Dummy

Conducting a citizen police
academy: Dummy

Conducting a citizen police
academy: Dummy

Training citizens in community
policing (e.g., community
mobilization, problem-solving):
Dummy

Training citizens in community
policing (e.g., community
mobilization, problem-solving):
Dummy

None

During the 12-month period
ending June 30, 2000, which of
the following groups did your
agency meet with regularly (at
least once every 3 months) to
address crime-related problems?
Mark all that apply.

During the 12-month period
ending June 30, 2003, did your
agency have a problem-solving
partnership or written agreement
with any of the following? Mark
all that apply.

During the 12-month period
ending September 30, 2007, did
your agency have a problemsolving partnership or written
agreement with any of the
following?













Advocacy groups
Business groups
Domestic violence
groups
Local public agencies
Neighborhood
associations
Religious groups
School groups
Senior citizen groups
Tenants’ associations
Youth service
organizations
Did not meet with any
groups












Advocacy groups
Business groups
Faith-based
organizations
Local government
agencies (non-law
enforcement agencies)
Other local law
enforcement agencies
Neighborhood
associations
Senior citizen groups
School groups
Youth service
organizations
None of the above










Advocacy groups
Business groups
Faith-based
organizations
Other local law
enforcement agencies
Neighborhood
associations
Senior citizen groups
School groups
Youth service
organizations

To keep as much information as possible from the LEMAS dataset, I constructed
two dependent variables from 2000 and 2003 and two separate dependent variables from
2003 and 2007. That is, I constructed two sets of dependent variables for two separate
analyses. For the analysis of 2000 and 2003 data, 10 overlapping items were included: (1)
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citizen academy; (2) training citizens; (3) advocacy group; (4) business groups; (5) school
groups; (6) senior citizen groups; (7) local public (government) agencies; (8) youth
service; (9) neighborhood associations; and (10) religious groups (faith-based
organizations).
For the analysis of 2003 and 2007, nine overlapping items were included: (1)
citizen academy; (2) advocacy group; (3) business groups; (4) school groups; (5) senior
citizen groups; (6) local government agencies; (7) youth service; (8) neighborhood
associations; and (9) faith-based organizations.

(2) Problem-Solving Approach
The problem-solving approach requires police agencies to apply different
methods in tackling local problems. That is, police departments actively propose and
develop the problem-solving approach within their organizations. Also, police agencies
communicate directly with community members to find out the problems and concerns
from residents’ perspective (Fridell, 2004).
The LEMAS 2000 through 2007 included four items on the problem-solving
element of community policing suggested by Fridell (2004): (1) encouraging officers to
engage in problem-solving projects; (2) forming problem-solving partnerships with
community groups; (3) including problem-solving projects in evaluating officers; and (4)
surveying citizens. Items included in this dimension are shown in Table 4.4.
As in the case with community engagement variables, however, slight differences
were identified. For instance, in the LEMAS 2000, a response option on problem-solving
partnership asked “Formed problem-solving partnerships with community groups, public
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agencies, or others through specialized contracts or written agreements.” In the LEMAS
2003 and 2007, the response option changed into “Partnered with citizen groups and
included their feedback in the development of neighborhood or community policing
strategies.” This research treated the two questions as the same.

Table. 4.4. Description of Problem-Solving Element in the LEMAS (2000-2007)
2000
Actively encouraged patrol officers
to engage in SARA-type problemsolving projects on their beats:
Yes/No

2003
Actively encouraged patrol officers
to engage in SARA-type problemsolving projects on their beats:
Yes/No

Formed problem-solving
partnerships with community
groups, public agencies, or others
through specialized contracts or
written agreements.

Partnered with citizen groups and
included their feedback in the
development of neighborhood or
community policing strategies

Included collaborative problemsolving projects in the evaluation
criteria of patrol officers

Included collaborative problemsolving projects in the evaluation
criteria of patrol officers

During the 12-month period ending
June 30, 2000, did your agency
conduct or sponsor a survey of
citizens on any of the following
topics? Mark all that apply.

During the 12-month period ending
June 30, 2003, did your agency
conduct or sponsor a survey of
citizens on any of the following
topics? Mark all that apply.







Public satisfaction with
police services
Public perceptions of
crime/disorder problems
Personal crime experiences
of citizens
Reporting of crimes to law
enforcement by citizens
Other – Specify







2007
Actively encouraged patrol
officers to engage in SARAtype problem-solving
projects on their beats:
Yes/No
Partnered with citizen
groups and included their
feedback in the development
of neighborhood or
community policing
strategies
Included collaborative
problem-solving projects in
the evaluation criteria of
patrol officers
Conducted or sponsored a
survey of citizens on crime,
fear of crime, or satisfaction
with police services: Yes/No

Public satisfaction with
police services
Public perception of
crime/disorder problems
Personal crime experiences
of citizens
Reporting of crimes to law
enforcement by citizens
Other (please specify)

Also, in the LEMAS 2000 and 2003, a survey question asked “did your agency
conduct or sponsor a survey of citizens on any of the following topics?” The response
options provided four different types of surveys. In the LEMAS 2007, however, the
question changed into a dichotomous item that included three types of surveys:
63

“Conducted or sponsored a survey of citizens on crime, fear of crime, or satisfaction with
police services.” Table 4.4 presents the description of problem-solving approach elements
of questions included in the LEMAS 2000 through 2007.
Thus, for the analysis of 2000 and 2003, nine items were included to construct
dependent variables: (1) encouragement of a problem-solving project; (2) formation of a
problem-solving partnership; (3) evaluation of officers’ problem-solving; (4) survey on
satisfaction with police; (5) survey on perception of crime; (6) survey on experience of
crime; and (7) survey on reporting crime. For the analysis of 2003 and 2007 data,
however, the item on three types of surveys in the LEMAS 2003 (satisfaction with police,
perception of crime, and experience of crime) was recoded into a dichotomous variable to
match the variable in the LEMAS 2007.

(3) Organizational Transformation
The organizational transformation element of community policing included seven
items: (1) establishment of a formal community policing plan; (2) new officers’
community policing training; (3) community policing training on in-service sworn
personnel; (4) community policing training on civilian personnel; (5) geographic
placement of detectives; (6) geographic accountability for patrol officers; and (7)
technological upgrade for community. Table 4.5 presents the description of
organizational transformation elements of questions that were included in the LEMAS
2000 through 2007.
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Table. 4.5. Description of Organizational Transformation Element in the LEMAS
(2000-2007)
2000

2003

2007

As of June 30, 2000, did your
agency have a community policing
plan? Mark only one.: Yes,
formally written/Yes, not formally
written/No
During the 12-month period ending
June 30, 2000,
what proportion of agency
personnel received at least
eight hours of community policing
training (problem-solving, SARA,
community partnerships, etc.)?
New officer recruits: All/Half or
more/Less than half/None
In-service sworn personnel:
All/Half or more/Less than
half/None
Civilian personnel: All/Half or
more/Less than half/None

Maintained or created a formal,
written community policing plan:
Yes/No

Maintained an agency mission
statement that included a
community policing
component: Yes/No

During the 12-month period
ending June 30, 2003, what
proportion of agency personnel
received at least eight hours of
community policing training
(problem-solving, SARA,
community partnerships, etc.)?
New officer recruits: All/Half or
more/Less than half/None
In-service sworn personnel:
All/Half or more/Less than
half/None
Civilian personnel: All/Half or
more/Less than half/None

During the 12-month period
ending September 30, 2007,
what proportion of agency
personnel received at least
eight hours of community
policing training (problemsolving, SARA, community
partnerships, etc.)?
New officer recruits: All/Half
or more/Less than half/None
In-service sworn personnel:
All/Half or more/Less than
half/None

Assigned detectives to cases based
on geographic areas/beats

None

None

Gave patrol officers responsibility
for specific geographic areas/beats

Gave patrol officers responsibility
for specific geographic areas/beats

Upgraded technology to support
community policing activities

None

Gave patrol officers
responsibility for specific
geographic areas/beats
Upgraded technology to
support the analysis of
community problems

Some issues with the dependent variables need to be presented in advance. For
instance, differentiating agencies with actively ongoing community policing programs for
several years and those that showed short-term interests in community policing is not
possible. The issue of “dosage” or “quality” in community policing research has been
raised by prior studies (e.g., Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000) and this dissertation may not
overcome such issues. However, level of engagement in the community policing
activities can be addressed.

65

Pooling the LEMAS items may also present some concerns, especially regarding
content validity. It is critical for instruments to have strong content validity. In fact,
Haynes, Richard, and Kubany (1995:240) assert that “Data from an invalid instrument
can overrepresent, omit, or underrepresent some facets of the construct and reflect
variables outside the construct domain.” In other words, items included in each
dimension have to be “the most relevant and representative” for assessing each of the
community policing elements (Haynes et al., 1995:245).
As will be discussed later, the items included in each dimension of community
policing may not represent every aspect of community policing. Stated another way, the
dependent variables in this study are not necessarily exhaustive measures of community
policing activities by all local police departments. Nevertheless, these dependent
variables do reveal most of the community policing activities (or outputs) suggested by
Fridell (2004). Thus, while caution will be taken in drawing a firm conclusion from the
results and generalizing to all police departments, I used as much information as possible
from the LEMAS, one of the best data sources available that can identify organizational
factors and diverse activities of police departments in the United States (Hickman and
Piquero, 2009).

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Community Policing Units (CP Units)
The independent variable was dichotomous and defined by whether a police
department had a separate community policing unit (Yes=1, No=0). This study, like the
LEMAS surveys themselves, relies on police departments self-identifying whether or not
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they have specialized units that carry out community policing functions. 3 Establishment
of community policing units, however, may not reflect the overall specialization in police
organizations. For instance, police organizations can establish CP Units while eliminating
other specialized units. In this case, there will be no change in the division of labor.
In fact, measuring specialization is not simple and the complexity of quantifying
the degree of specialization present in an organization is not unique to police
departments. For instance, when measuring functional differentiation, investigators tend
to count the number of departments or supervisors based on organizational charts. This
method can be problematic because some specialized units or specialized personnel may
not be reflected in official organizational charts (Dewar and Hage, 1978). Another issue
related to the independent variable is that even when police agencies have separate
community policing units, they may not operate these units in the same manner. In fact,
research has found that police organizations apply different functional techniques in
specialization unit operation (Maguire and Gantley, 2009a). Moreover, the LEMAS did
not provide the precise definition of community policing units and it is not clear whether
community policing units have separate supervisors and personnel devoted only to
community policing activities within police departments.
Nevertheless, the creation and operation of CP Units is evidence of organizations’
strategies to divide policing tasks. First, considering that officers tend to complain about
the lack of time and resources to be involved in community policing, community policing
activities are expected to be implemented by specialized units (Maguire and Gantley,
2009a). Moreover, as Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) maintained, organizations do not
3

Prior studies consistently showed that some police agencies “over-respond” in some questions when
filling out the LEMAS (e.g., Maguire and Katz, 2002). By using other indicator items in the survey, I
corrected 20 cases. See Appendix 2 for details.
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respond to environmental demands or pressures in a stereotyped or uniform manner.
Rather, different subunits respond to their “subenvironment” in their own ways
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), so specialized units tend to focus on their own territory
and perform their major tasks. Thus, it may not be wrong to assume that specialized units
play a predominant role in carrying out community policing programs and that
investigating the role of specialized community policing units could reveal one aspect of
organizational specialization.

CONTROL VARIABLES
Police Strength
Police strength was utilized as one of the control variables. Police service is
heavily dependent upon personnel within the organization and prior research has
examined intraorganizational and external factors that may explain variations of
personnel strength among police agencies (see Koper, Maguire and Moore, 2001; Stucky,
2005 for an overview of the studies).
Police strength can influence police outcomes. For instance, police strength can
mediate the association between the level of racial dispersion and property crimes (Akins,
2003). Therefore, it may not be surprising that implementation of community policing
programs require more personnel resources because community engagement and the
problem-solving approach ask officers to engage more with their local residents and
problem-solving activities (He et al., 2005). In this research, the number of officers was
taken as a measure of police strength. Specifically, police strength was quantified as the
number of officers per 100,000 residents rather than the absolute number of full-time
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sworn officers. Thus, police strength was measured by dividing the number of full-time
sworn police officers by total population served by the police department multiplied by
100,000.

Occupational Differentiation
Occupational differentiation refers to the percentage of civilians within police
agencies and is used interchangeably with civilianization rate in this paper (Langworthy,
1985; Maguire, 2003). Skolnick and Bayley (1986) argued that civilianization of police
can improve community policing efforts by freeing sworn officers from involvement in
numerous administrative tasks and bringing in communities’ needs and wants to police
agencies. Therefore, civilianization of personnel was introduced as a control variable. It
was measured by dividing the number of full-time civilians by the total number of
personnel (full-time civilians and sworn police officers).

Operating Budget
The budget of a police agency is another factor that plays an important role in
implementing community policing (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997). Police departments with
sufficient resources to implement community policing have at their disposal more
personnel and facilities. These resources, in turn, can facilitate the agencies’ decisions to
carry out diverse community policing activities. Resources here are measured by dividing
total operating budget by the number of full-time sworn police officers.
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Crime Rate
Numerous studies have consistently found that characteristics of communities
affect the willingness of residents to cooperate with police in enhancing the quality of
living through crime prevention and problem-solving policing (e.g., Greene, 2000). Also,
police behavior varies across communities (Klinger, 1997) and crime prevention
programs are less effective in criminally active communities (Bursik and Grasmick,
1993). Similarly, crime-stricken areas are less likely to be involved in crime prevention
activities implemented by the police (Rosenbaum, Lurigio, and Davis, 1998). Thus, crime
rate was also included as one of the control variables.
Data for crime rate were from the Uniform Crime Report Crime 2000, 2003, and
2007. Crime rate was measured by using the following computation: index crime
(criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft,
and motor vehicle theft) / population * 100,000. Descriptive statistics for all variables are
presented in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7.

METHODS OF ANALYSIS
Linear panel analysis was chosen to examine the change of three elements of
community policing activities across time. This analytic approach was appropriate
because data were collected multiple times and I was interested in finding why program
implementation (i.e., outputs) of community policing in some police agencies changed
more than in other departments (Finkel, 2008).
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Table 4.6. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables for Analysis I and II
Analysis I (LEMAS 2000 & 2003)
LEMAS 2000

Min

Max.

Mean

LEMAS 2003

S.D.

N

Min.

Max.

Mean

S.D.

n

Community
Engagement

0

10

6.29

2.79

638

0

10

5.31

3.20

632

Problem-Solving

0

7

2.76

2.12

638

0

7

2.94

2.16

634

Organizational
Transformation

0

5

2.51

1.21

632

0

5

2.24

1.13

590

Analysis II (LEMAS 2003 & 2007)
LEMAS 2003

Min.

Max.

Mean

LEMAS 2007

S.D.

n

Min.

Max.

Mean

S.D.

n

Community
Engagement

0

9

5.75

2.58

636

0

9

5.99

2.80

628

Problem-Solving

0

4

1.92

1.28

636

0

4

2.09

1.31

631

Organizational
Transformation

0

4

2.20

1.07

603

0

4

2.17

1.07

596
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Table 4.7. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variable and Control Variables
LEMAS 2000
Min.
CP Units

Max.

Mean

LEMAS 2003
S.D.

n

Min.

Max.

Mean

LEMAS 2007
S.D.

n

Min.

Max.

Mean

S.D.

n

0

1

0.65

0.48

626

0

1

0.58

0.49

626

0

1

.057

0.50

636

Police Strength

1.33

73.38

18.11

1.00

641

1.36

71.28

17.82

9.78

641

1.22

66.51

18.00

9.80

641

Occupational
Differentiation

0.00

75.30

25.04

12.50

641

0.08

40.00

10.12

5.37

640

0.00

85.37

29.37

16.12

641

Operating Budget
(logged)

9.80

13.03

11.43

0.41

641

8.68

13.10

11.56

0.48

641

7.92

13.30

11.79

0.53

641

Crime Rate

0.00

0.28

0.05

0.04

641

0.00

0.30

0.05

0.04

641

0.00

0.25

0.05

0.04

641
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The dependent variables were continuous outputs calculated from summating
numerous community policing indicators, and the data structure was TSCS (Menard,
2002). In short, linear panel analysis is suitable for analyzing “continuous outcomes for
multiple units at multiple points” (Finkel, 2008:475, emphasis original). As mentioned
above, two separate analyses were based on two-period panel data.

FIXED EFFECTS VERSUS RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS
Linear panel data can be analyzed by two distinct methods: fixed effects and
random effects model (Allison, 1994; Finkel, 2008; Menard, 2002). Both models start
from the simple principle of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and can be expressed as
follows:

(Equation 1)

Where

(i=1….n) is the intercept for each police organization and

dependent variables where i = police department and t = time.
variable and

is the

is one independent

is the coefficient for that predictor variable. Finally,

is the error term

for case i at time t. One of the key assumptions of OLS is that the error terms are not
correlated.
In a fixed effects model, it is assumed that case i at time t is not correlated with
case i at time t+1 or t+2 in Equation 1 (Finkel, 2008). Accordingly, analysts came up
with the idea of the unobservable factor that is unique to case i, or Ui. The unobservables
are also assumed to be related to Y. For instance, in this research, the U term may include
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culture of police organizations, willingness to implement community policing, or degree
of officers’ racial composition. Equation 1 can consequently be rewritten as follows:

(Equation 2)

In contrast, a random effects model assumes that the error component, Ui, is not
correlated with a dependent variable (Yit) and other explanatory variables (Xji) across all
time periods in the equation. This is the key difference between fixed and random effects
models (Wooldridge, 2012). Thus, if Ui is not independent of any explanatory variables,
then a random effects model will produce biased results. In other words, a fixed effects
model should be used when there is a reason to believe that Ui may be correlated with an
outcome variable or any independent variable (Finkel, 2008; Wooldridge, 2012).
It should be noted, however, that the random effects approach can be used if
theoretical justification exists that error terms are unrelated to explanatory variables in the
model. In fact, one of reasons for using panel data is to allow for the correlation(s)
between Ui and Xji variables (Finkel, 2008; Wooldridge, 2012). One advantage of using a
random effects model is that such an approach can estimate the effect of time-invariant
variables. For instance, random effects model can show the effect of type of agencies
(i.e., sheriff’s departments vs. municipal police departments) on the outcome variable. In
a fixed effects model, the time-constant factors are dropped out of the model
automatically.
However, as mentioned above, it may be difficult to argue that one of the error
terms in Equation 2 (i.e., Ui) is uncorrelated with other independent variables or outcome
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variables. That is, the unobserved department-specific effect can be related to other
control variables (e.g., crime, size, budget, etc.) in the model used in this study.
Therefore, I decided to use the fixed effects model and subdivided the sample into two—
sheriff’s departments and municipal police departments—rather than using type of
agencies as one of the control variables.

FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Equation 2 shows that each unit has its own intercept,
average intercept for the dependent variable and
stable in case i. Thus,

, where

is the

is the unobservable factor that is

makes each intercept move up or down. To solve this problem,

dummy variables for n-1 units can be included to control for individual specific effects
(Finkel, 2008). This is why the fixed-effects model is also called the least squares dummy
variable model. When n is large, however, it is impractical to include all dummy
variables. Therefore, more a common way to do the analysis is to calculate unit level
means of all observable variables, as is written in Equation 3:
̅

̅

̅

̅

̅
̅

(Equation 3)

Then Equation 4 can be written by subtracting Equation 3 from Equation 2.

̅

(

̅ )

̅ )

(

(

̅ )

(

̅)

(Equation 4)

75

̅ because Ui is constant over time, so the (

In Equation 4,

̅ ) part is

removed. Another approach is the so-called first difference model (Equation 5). This
model also eliminates the unobservable and unit-specific effect— —by subtracting
Equation 2 from one-time period lag equation:

(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

(Equation 5)

Again,

, so stable unit effects are controlled in Equation 5. In fact, despite the

parsimony of the model, Equation 5 is a great method to take into account unobservable
differences among subjects (Finkel, 2008). Specifically, it is reasonable to expect that
differences of community policing activities may be not only from explanatory variables
but also from other factors that are not included in the model but are constant within a
unit. Thus, Equation 5 can provide an insight into the effect of change in X on the change
of Y. Equation 4 and Equation 5 produce a consistent result when T=2 (Finkel, 2008), so
this study will investigate the effect of specialization on outputs of community policing
programs using both equations.
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
This chapter examines how specialized units have operationally changed in the
first decade of the 21st century. More importantly, I will examine whether the creation of
specialized community policing units (CP Units) play a role in producing community
policing outputs. Thirteen types of subunits were selected to identify patterns of the
change in specialized units. I explored whether police agencies have increased or
decreased the operation of specialized community policing units across time. As a first
step to investigate the relationship between community policing units and community
policing activities, independent sample t-tests were performed. Then linear panel analysis
was used to draw causal inferences between community policing units and their program
implementation.

CREATION OF SPECIALIZED POLICE UNITS
INCREASE OF OPERATION
As discussed before, the longitudinal dataset in this research makes it possible to
trace the prevalence of specialized units among police departments in the United States.
Figure 5.1 shows the patterns of numerous police subunits from 2000 to 2007. The bar
graph includes thirteen different types of specialized units included in the LEMAS
between 2000 and 2007. Because these units were included in all three waves of data
collection, changes of unit operation could be identified.
As Figure 5.1 shows, the results show interesting patterns. First, the portion of
agencies in the sample that had bias crime units continuously increased from 6.7% in
2000 to 8.1% in 2003 and to 8.3% in 2007. The growth of bias crime units can be
77

understood within the growth in public awareness of bias crime—sometimes referred to
as hate crime—in recent years. Sandholtz, Langton, and Planty (2013) found that,
although racially motivated crime has decreased, crime motivated by religious reasons
has increased since the early 21st century. Bias crime, even if committed to a single
person, can be regarded as a threat to whole groups (religious, sexual orientation,
ethnicity, etc.). Thus, although the vast majority of police agencies do not have bias crime
units, increasing number of police departments seem to feel more pressure from such
groups to tackle and prevent such crimes (Bell, 2002).
Figure 5.1. Operation of Specialized Police Units (n=641)
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The portion of agencies that contained domestic violence units increased from
45.1% in 2000 to 54.1% in 2007. Like the general crime trend since the 1990s, domestic
violence, more frequently called intimate partner violence, also declined continuously
during the same period (Catalano, 2012). However, due to the characteristics of this
crime—i.e., emotional and physical intimacy between offenders and victims, repeated
victimization, direct effect on other family members, etc.—policy makers as well as
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scholars have paid much attention to this type of crime. Thus, it is not surprising that
police departments have also invested their resources in tackling this issue.
Missing child units have consistently increased—from 45.2% of police agencies
having the units in 2000 to 52.7% and 53.7% in 2003 and 2007 respectively—even while
there has been no concurrent evidence that the number of missing child cases has
increased. On the contrary, during the last decades of the 20th century, missing child cases
continuously decreased (Hammer, Finkelhor, Sedlak, and Porcellini, 2004). Police
agencies with written policy or specialized missing units have been shown to be more
aggressive in investigating missing child cases (Speirs, 1998). Thus, the increase of
missing child units can be understood in terms of police recognition that even a small
number of missing child cases is an important issue to address. Also, political pressure
can be a factor in agencies’ increased reliance on the missing child units.
The expansion of cyber-crime units has been even more dramatic. In 2000, fewer
than 20% of police agencies in the sample had specialized cyber-crime units. Less than a
decade later, however, that percentage had increased more than two-fold—close to 40%
of agencies were equipped with the units that could tackle crime committed in cyber
space.
Cyber-crime is important not only among private parties. This relatively new type
of crime poses a challenge to local law enforcement agencies because police
organizations need to be equipped with new technology and skills to address diverse
issues (Goodman, 1997). Child pornography, identify theft, fraud, and cyber bullying are
some examples of cyber-crime. Therefore, though some critics lament the lack of
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attention on the crime in the virtual world, police agencies have expanded their field of
duty to the virtual space during the last decade (Davis, 2012).
The percentage of crime analysis units also grew in this period. In 2000, just over
half of agencies had crime analysis units. The percentage kept increasing, and in 2007,
more than 66% of police departments had crime analysis units within their organizations.
Increase of crime analysis functionality can be from the recognition that support for
crime scene investigation through scientific analysis is essential in catching offenders and
proving evidence to courts. The trend identified in Figure 5.1 suggests that police
organizations were increasingly spending more resources on this area.
Internal affairs units have also increased. Close to 77% of police departments
already had a unit responsible for maintaining the integrity of officers’ behavior in 2000.
This number increased to 83.5% of the sample in 2007. Addressing misconduct or
corruption by a few police officers in an appropriate manner plays a significant role in
keeping the integrity and trust of police departments (Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services, 2009). Although research has not evaluated the effectiveness of the
units (Skogan and Frydl, 2004), police agencies have nonetheless increasingly formed
internal affairs units since the early 2000s.
In short, descriptive statistics from 2000 to 2007 show that police agencies
responded to social changes and increased public awareness by creating relevant
specialized units that are committed to tackle problems in the communities.
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DECREASE OF OPERATION
As shown in Figure 5.1, other categories of crime showed the opposite pattern of
subunit utilization. For instance, police agencies seemed to decrease the operation of
juvenile crime units. In 2000, more than 60% of police agencies had specialized units
solely devoted to juvenile crimes. However, the percentage decreased to 58.3% in 2003
and to 55.5% in 2007. Crime committed by juveniles (i.e., aged under 18) and juvenile
victimization also decreased since early 1990s (Snyder and Sickmund, 2006), but it is not
clear why police organizations decreasingly relied on specialized units specifically for
juveniles.
The number of drug education units also decreased in the same period. Police
have been involved in numerous school-based educational programs, notably through
Drug Abuse Resistance Education and Gang Resistance Education and Training.
Research on the effectiveness of such program, however, yielded mixed results (see
Ennet, Tobler, Ringwalt, and Flewelling, 1994; Esbensen and Osgood, 1999). The data in
this study showed that police agencies relied less on specialized drug education units in
2007 as compared to 2000.
Temporal shifts in the number of drunk driver, repeat offender, and gang units did
not seem to follow any particular pattern. For instance, in 2000, 28.4% of local police
departments had drunk driver units. The percentage decreased to 27.8% in 2003, but then
increased to 36.7% in 2007. Repeat offender units showed a similar pattern. More than
13% of police departments operated repeat offender units in 2000. After a small drop in
2003 (11.4%), however, the percentage increased to more than 16% in 2007. Also, close
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to 45% of police agencies ran specialized gang units in 2000. However, the percentage
dropped to 38.7% in 2003 before increasing to 54.4% in 2007.
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is not clear whether police agencies set up
specialized units from rational decision-making to tackle increasing local problems or
from political or media pressures. However, it is clear that police departments have
increasingly relied on some subunits (e.g., bias crime units, cyber-crime units, crime
analysis units, internal affairs units, etc.), while some other units (e.g., juvenile crime
units, drug education units, etc.) have been decreasingly utilized by police organizations.

OPERATION OF COMMUNITY POLICING UNITS
Table 5.1 indicates that police organizations varied in operating community
policing units across time. For instance, while 202 agencies (31.5% of sample)
maintained community policing units from 2000 to 2007, 105 departments (16.4% ) did
not have dedicated units responsible for implementing community policing activities. In
other words, close to half of police agencies in the sample maintained the same approach
to the matter of CP Units throughout the course of the years studied; about 32% always
had one and about 16% never did.
For the remaining 52.1% of agencies, however, specialized community policing
units came and went during the seven-year period. About 10% of agencies had CP Units
in 2000 and 2003, but did not have CP Units in 2007. However, about 9% of agencies
had CP Units in 2000, no CP Units in 2003, and CP Units again in 2007. In short, a look
at the data disclosed some notable temporal fluctuations among agencies with respect to
the presence of specialized CP Units goes.
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Table 5.1. Change of Community Policing Units from 2000 to 2007 (n=641)
LEMAS 2000

LEMAS 2003

LEMAS 2007

Frequency

CP Unit

202 (31.5%)

No Unit

81 (12.6%)

CP Unit

59 (9.2%)

No Unit

61 (9.5%)

CP Unit

57 (8.9%)

No Unit

34 (5.3%)

CP Unit

42 (6.6%)

No Unit

105 (16.4%)

CP Unit
CP Unit
No Unit

CP Unit
No Unit
No Unit
n

641 (100%)

I also separately examined Sheriffs’ Departments and Municipal Police
Departments regarding their operation of CP Units over time. As Table 5.2 shows, similar
patterns were identified in both groups. A total of 53 out of 218 sheriffs’ departments
(26.8%) had CP Units across all three waves of the data collection period. During the
same period, 33.6% of municipal police departments consistently had CP Units. There
were also some Sheriffs’ Department and Municipal Police Departments that did not
operate CP Units at any point during the years examined—27.8% and 11.3%,
respectively.
Other departments were not consistent where the presence of specialized CP Units
was concerned—45.4% of Sheriffs’ Departments and 55.1% of Municipal Police
Departments. Examining these fluctuations further, 10.1% of Sheriffs’ Departments had
CP Units in 2000 and 2003, but they did not have the same unit in 2007. Also, 7.2% of
Municipal Police Departments did not operate CP Units in 2000, but did in 2003 and
2007.

83

Table 5.2. Change of Community Policing Units by Type of Agencies (n=641)
Frequency
LEMAS 2000

LEMAS 2003

LEMAS 2007

Sheriff’s Dept.

Municipal PD

CP Units

53 (26.8%)

149 (33.6%)

No Units

20 (10.1%)

61 (13.8%)

CP Units

12 (6.1%)

47 (10.6%)

No Units

24 (12.1%)

37 (8.4%)

CP Units

15 (7.6%)

42 (9.5%)

No Units

9 (4.5%)

25 (5.6%)

CP Units

10 (5.1%)

32 (7.2%)

No Units

55 (27.8%)

50 (11.3%)

198 (100%)

443 (100%)

CP Units
CP Units
No Units

CP Units
No Units
No Units
n

In short, variations in operating CP Units existed both in Sheriffs’ Departments
and Municipal Police Departments. While many police agencies kept consistency in
management of a subunit for community policing (either through operating or not
operating a CP Unit), the majority of agencies altered their operation of CP Units over
time.
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CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS
BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS
Table 5.3 reports the bivariate correlations for all variables included in Analysis I
(see Table 4.2 for details about Analysis I and Analysis II). As the table shows, the CP
Units 2000 variable was significantly correlated with every dependent variable. Also, the
CP Units 2003 variable was significantly correlated with all dependent variables in the
analysis.
Correlations among variables included in Analysis II are shown in Table 5.4. CP
Units 2003 was correlated with half of the dependent variables: Community Engagement
2003, Problem-Solving 2003, and Organizational Transformation 2003 variables.
However, CP Units 2007 was significantly correlated with all dependent variables except
for the Community Engagement 2003 variable.

INDEPENDENT T-TESTS
Independent t-tests were used to assess whether if the means of each community
policing element for two groups (agencies with CP Units vs. agencies without CP Units)
were significantly different. In other words, t-tests were performed to find if police
departments with CP Units have different community policing activities compared to
agencies without such units. This analysis was repeated across three waves of data. Thus,
nine separate t-tests were conducted to see whether the means differed across three
elements of community policing program implementation.
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Table 5.3. Correlation Matrix of Variables in the LEMAS 2000 and the LEMAS 2003
1
1

2

1. Unit2000

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

2. Unit2003

0.26**

1

3. CE2000

0.15**

0.15**

1

4. CE2003

0.11**

0.20**

0.27**

1

5. PS2000

0.12**

0.15**

0.45**

0.19**

1

6. PS2003

0.09*

0.17**

0.21**

0.41**

0.40**

1

7. OT2000

0.19**

0.12**

0.36**

0.19**

0.40**

0.27**

1

8. OT2003

0.11**

0.21**

0.20**

0.31**

0.22**

0.41**

0.20**

1

9. Strength2000

0.14**

0.16**

0.09*

0.08

0.07

0.04

0.20**

0.12**

1

10.Strength2003

0.12**

0.17**

0.09*

0.08*

0.07

0.05

0.20**

0.13**

0.98**

1

11. OD2000

-0.02

-0.04

0.09*

0.13**

0.14**

0.15**

0.04

-0.03

-0.38**

-0.36**

1

12. OD2003

-0.17

-0.11**

-0.21**

-0.23**

-0.11**

-0.11**

-0.12**

-0.15**

-0.20**

-0.22**

-0.01

1

13. Budget2000

-0.07

-0.10*

0.01

0.02

0.05

0.03

-0.01

-0.04

-0.42**

-0.42**

0.55**

0.00**

1

14. Budget2003

-0.04

-0.11**

0.04

0.01

0.08*

0.02

-0.02

-0.06

-0.42**

-0.46**

0.50**

0.12**

0.67**

1

15. Crime2000

0.13**

0.13**

0.16**

0.09*

0.12**

0.11**

0.23**

0.14**

0.68**

0.68**

-0.16**

-0.26**

-0.31**

-0.33**

1

16. Crime2003

0.15**

0.12**

0.16**

0.08*

0.16**

0.11**

0.23**

0.15**

0.66**

0.67**

-0.17**

-0.25**

-0.31**

-0.33**

0.93**

16

1

Notes: CE2000 stands for the community engagement element of community policing in year 2000. PS stands for the problem-solving element. OT stands for organizational transformation. OD stands
for occupational differentiation.
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Table 5.4. Correlation Matrix of Variables in the LEMAS 2003 and the LEMAS 2007
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

1. CPUnit2003

1

2. CPUnit2007

0.28**

1

3. CE2003

0.16**

0.08

1

4. CE2007

0.02

0.23**

0.22**

1

5. PS2003

0.11**

0.09*

0.47**

0.22**

1

6. PS2007

0.06

0.31**

0.25**

0.46**

0.35**

1

7. OT2003

0.22**

0.18**

0.18**

0.17**

0.26**

0.28**

1

8. OT2007

0.05

0.28**

0.18**

0.35**

0.19**

0.49**

0.16**

1

9. Strength2003

0.17**

0.13**

0.09*

0.09*

0.06

0.10**

0.13**

0.21**

1

10.Strength2007

0.18**

0.16**

0.07

0.09*

0.08*

0.12**

0.14**

0.21**

0.94**

1

11. OD2003

-0.10*

-0.09*

-0.21**

-0.20**

-0.11**

-0.13**

-0.14**

-0.18**

-0.22**

-0.19**

1

12. OD2007

-0.08*

-0.10**

-0.01

-0.02

0.02

-0.03

-0.07

-0.09*

-0.50**

-0.52**

0.05

1

13. Budget2003

-0.10**

-0.02

0.03

0.04

0.11**

0.08*

-0.04

-0.01

-0.45**

-0.42**

0.09*

0.53**

1

14. Budget2007

-0.07

-0.04

0.07

0.00

0.10*

0.05

-0.05

0.00

-0.42**

-0.45**

-0.03

0.64**

0.68**

1

15. Crime2003

0.12**

0.11**

0.15**

0.18**

0.16**

0.14**

0.17**

0.22**

0.67**

0.63**

-0.26**

-0.38**

-0.32**

-0.33**

1

16. Crime2007

0.15**

0.09*

0.13**

0.14**

0.13**

0.12**

0.17**

0.19**

0.65**

0.65**

-0.23**

-0.40**

-0.36**

-0.37**

0.91**

16

1

Notes: CE2003 stands for the community engagement element of community policing in year 2003. PS stands for the problem-solving element; OT stands for organizational transformation. OD stands
for occupational differentiation.
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The LEMAS 2000
A statistically significant difference existed between police agencies with CP
Units and those without the units in the community engagement element of community
policing activities (t (624)=-3.84, p<.05). Agencies with CP Units had a higher level of
the community engagement dimension of community policing activities (M=6.65,
SD=2.65) than those without CP Units (M=5.77, SD=2.82).
There was also a significant difference between police agencies with CP Units
and those without the units in the problem-solving element of community policing
activities (t (624)=-2.92, p<.05). Police organizations with CP Units had a higher level of
problem-solving element of community policing activities (M=2.96, SD=2.07) than
agencies without CP Units (M=2.44, SD=2.18).
Finally, a statistically significant difference existed between police agencies with
CP Units and without the units in the organizational transformation aspect of community
policing activities (t (624)=-4.96, p<.05). Like the above two elements, organizational
transformation elements of community policing activities were higher in police agencies
with CP Units (M=2.68, SD=1.17) than departments without CP Units (M=2.19,
SD=1.24).

The LEMAS 2003
A t-test indicated that a statistically significant difference existed between police
agencies with CP Units and without the units in the community engagement element of
community policing activities (t (620)=-5.01, p<.05). That is, CP Units were associated
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with a higher level of the community engagement dimension of community policing
activities.
Also, a statistically significant difference existed between police agencies with CP
Units and without the units in the problem-solving element of community policing
activities (t (622)=-4.41, p<.05). CP Units seem to be associated with a higher level of
problem-solving of community policing activities.
Lastly, a t-test showed that a statistically significant difference existed between
police agencies with CP Units and without the units in the organizational transformation
aspect of community policing activities (t (579)=-5.21, p<.05). Unlike the result from the
LEMAS 2000, police departments with CP Units showed a higher level of the
organizational transformation elements of community policing activities compared to
agencies without CP Units.

The LEMAS 2007
A t-test showed that a statistically significant difference existed between police
agencies with CP Units and without the units in the community engagement element of
community policing activities (t (628)=-6.02, p<.05). That is, CP Units appear to be
associated with a higher level of the community engagement dimension of community
policing activities.
Also, a statistically significant difference existed between police agencies with CP
Units and without the units in the problem-solving element of community policing
activities (t (631)=-8.05, p<.05). Results showed that CP Units seem to be associated with
a higher level of the problem-solving element of community policing activities.
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Last, a t-test showed that a statistically significant difference existed between
police agencies with CP Units with and without the units in the organizational
transformation aspect of community policing activities (t (596)=-6.98, p<.05). Unlike the
result from the LEMAS 2000, police departments with CP Units showed a higher level of
the organizational transformation elements of community policing activities compared to
agencies without CP Units.

Summary
Results from three waves of data suggested that specialized community policing
units were positively associated with community policing program implementation.
Police departments with such specialized units performed more activities that involved
the community engagement, problem-solving, and organizational transformation aspects
of community policing. In short, the results suggest that the creation of community
policing units significantly affects program implementation by police departments.

LINEAR PANEL ANALYSIS
Two separate analyses were conducted to see the change and the effect of change
on community policing units: Analysis I for the change of all agencies between 2000 and
2003 and Analysis II for the change between 2003 and 2007. As mentioned earlier, I
decided to conduct two separate analyses due to some discrepancies of items included in
three waves of the LEMAS survey (see Chapter 4 for details).
Panel analysis results for Sheriffs’ Department and Municipal Police Departments
between 2000 and 2003 will be presented below, followed by results for 2003 and 2007.
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In addition, by examining significant differences between coefficients across two groups,
I investigated the interactive effects of different types of agencies (i.e., Sheriffs’
Department versus Municipal Police Department) on each element of community
policing activities (see below for details). A z-test then compared coefficients of
independent variables in each group.

ANALYSIS I AND ANALYSIS II FOR ALL DEPARTMENTS
Analysis I
Analysis I employs the LEMAS 2000 and 2003 waves of data that included both
Sheriffs’ Departments and Municipal Police Departments. Table 5.5 provides the results
of linear panel analysis of the association between CP Units and police organizations’
implementation of three elements of community policing. In each element, Model 1
included only CP Units as an independent variable, while Model 2 addressed four control
variables to investigate the possible mediating effects of police strength, occupational
differentiation, operating budget, and crime rate variables.
The presence of CP Units was significantly (p<0.01) and positively associated
with the community engagement element. In other words, police agencies with CP Units
were more likely to implement community policing activities that involve close
interaction with residents and other community members and groups.
Model 2 included three intra-organizational factors (i.e., police strength,
occupational differentiation, and operating budget (logged)) and crime rate as control
variables. In this model, CP Units was still significantly (p<0.05) related to the
community engagement dimension of community policing. Also, the direction of the
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relation was not changed. That is, controlling for the effect of police strength,
civilianization, budget, and crime rate, police agencies with CP Units implemented on
average 0.52 more community policing programs that involved close interactions with
their residents. Thus, the initial relationship did hold even when controlling for four
possible spurious factors.
Among control variables, only occupational differentiation was positively
associated with the community engagement element. Thus, the data showed that police
departments with more civilian personnel were more likely to implement community
policing programs that engage their citizens. However, other control variables failed to
achieve statistically significant associations with community engagement programs.
The association between CP Units and the problem-solving element of
community policing is revealed in the second column of Table 5.5. Results indicate that
CP Units were not significantly associated with community policing activities that focus
on the adoption of new approaches in solving community problems. Similarly, the
analysis disclosed that none of the control variables had a significant relationship with the
problem-solving element of community policing.
The third column of Table 5.5 shows the effect of CP Units on the organizational
transformation dimension of community policing. Model 1, which included only CP
Units as an independent variable, indicated that agencies with specialized community
policing units were more likely to implement the organizational transformation aspect of
community policing (p<0.01) than were their counterparts without such units. When four
control variables (i.e., police strength, occupational differentiation, operating budget
(logged), and crime rate) were introduced, the significance of CP Units did not disappear.
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In other words, the control variables did not mediate the association between CP Units
and agencies’ activities where the organizational change aspect of community policing
was concerned.
Among intra-organizational factors and crime rate, only occupational
differentiation was significantly and positively associated with community policing
activities that focused on changing organizational priorities. That is, police agencies with
more civilians are more likely to focus on the organizational transformation aspects of
community policing net of other variables in the model. Also, three control variables—
police strength, budget, and crime rate—did not reach significance.
In short, based on data from LEMAS 2000 and 2003, the presence of CP Units
was significantly associated with community engagement and organizational
transformation aspects of community policing. Agencies with specialized units solely
devoted to community policing were more likely to implement programs that involve
interactions with residents and reflect a change in organizational priorities.

Analysis II
Analysis II employed the LEMAS 2003 and 2007 waves of data for all types of
agencies. Table 5.6 reports the association between CP Units and three different elements
of community policing program implementation during 2003 and 2007. The community
engagement element of community policing is reported in the first column of Table 5.6.
Model 1, which only included CP Units, showed that agencies with specialized
community policing units were more likely to perform activities that highlight the close
interaction between police organizations and residents than their counterparts without CP
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Units. Even when four control variables were introduced in the model as in Model 2, the
significance of CP Units remained (p<0.01). It is also worth noting that none of the
control variables were significantly associated with the CP Units measure in Model 2. In
short, as in Analysis I, police departments with CP Units were more likely to perform
community engagement aspects of community policing programs.
The second column of Table 5.6 shows the association between CP Units and
police agencies’ implementation of the problem-solving element of community policing
activities. Again, linear panel analysis revealed that CP Units were significantly (p<0.01)
associated with the problem-solving dimension of community policing activities while
holding other variables in the model constant. That is, agencies with the specialized units
were more likely to have programs that stress the problem-solving approach in tackling
local problems net of other factors.
The relationship between CP Units and the organizational transformation
dimension of community policing is provided in the third column of Table 5.6. CP Units
were significantly (p<0.01) and positively associated with agencies’ activities that
emphasized organizational investment in officers’ training and evaluation in community
policing activities. The inclusion of four control variables did not change the relationship
between CP Units and the organizational transformation dimensions of community
policing program implementation. In other words, controlling for police strength, civilian
employees, operating budget, and crime rate, CP Units were positively related to the
organizational transformation elements of community policing implementation. An
average of 0.38 more organizational transformation programs were implemented in
police agencies with CP Units relative to ones without such specialized units.
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Table 5.5. Linear panel analysis results of the effect of CP Units on three elements of community policing (2000-2003)
Community Engagement
Model 1

Problem-Solving

Model 2

Model 1

Organizational Transformation
Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

0.67

0.25**

0.52

0.25*

0.15

0.16

0.14

0.16

0.36

0.11**

0.32

0.11**

Police Strength

0.07

0.07

-0.01

0.04

0.02

0.03

Occup. Diff.

0.03

0.01**

-0.01

0.00

0.01

0.00**

Budget

-0.67

0.41

-0.27

0.26

-0.16

0.18

Crime Rate

-2.13

10.15

-11.54

6.45

3.44

4.48

CP Unit

n

1244

1244

1246

1246

1203

1203

NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged operating budget. *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Table 5.6. Linear panel analysis results of the effect of CP Units on three elements of community policing (2003-2007)
Community Engagement
Model 1

Problem-Solving

Model 2

Model 1

Organizational Transformation
Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

1.08

0.22**

1.03

0.23**

0.48

0.10**

0.49

0.10**

0.38

0.10**

0.38

0.10**

Police Strength

0.06

0.04

-0.00

0.02

-0.00

0.02

Occup. Diff.

0.01

0.01

0.00

0.00

-0.00

0.00

Budget

-0.23

0.28

0.08

0.13

0.16

0.12

Crime Rate

-11.80

8.47

1.34

3.76

-2.94

3.83

CP Unit

n

1249

1249

1252

1252

1186

1186

NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged operating budget. *p<0.05, **p<0.01
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In short, linear panel analyses of the longitudinal data from the LEMAS 2003 and
2007 showed that CP Units were significantly associated with all three elements of
community policing activities. That is, the positive effect of specialized units on program
implementation was consistent in all three elements of community policing. In summary,
agencies with specialized units solely devoted to community policing were more likely to
perform three distinctive dimensions of community policing compared to departments
without CP Units.

FURTHER ANALYSES
As discussed in Chapter 3, local police departments in the United States are
highly heterogeneous in terms of their operations, personnel management, and priorities
in daily policing. One notable difference across departments is agency type. Sheriff and
police departments typically have notably different sorts of responsibilities and thus
different organizational structures from one another. Thus, I subdivided the sample into
two subsamples to investigate whether the association between CP Units and three
elements of community policing differed depending on the types of local police agencies:
Sheriffs’ Departments and Municipal Police Departments. After conducting separate
analyses for these two groups in 2000-2003 and 2003-2007, I examined whether any
observed differences between the two sorts of organizations were statistically significant.

Sheriffs’ Department in 2000-2003
The effect of CP Units in Sheriffs’ Departments based on the LEMAS 2000 and
2003 data is reported in Table 5.7. The analyses undertaken disclosed no significant
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effect of CP Units on any of the three elements of CP programs (p=0.07). Also, inclusion
of control variables did not change the impact of CP Units on any of the three different
elements of community policing—that is, the effect of CP Units was non-significant in
Model 2, which included four control variables.
Moreover, it is interesting that control variables are differentially associated with
each element of community policing (i.e., dependent variables). First, in the community
engagement dimension, only occupational differentiation achieved statistical significance
(p<0.05). That is, Sheriffs’ Departments with a high rate of civilian staff were more likely
to implement community policing activities that involve close interaction and
communication with their citizens. Second, the operating budget variable—measured by
total budget divided by the number of sworn officers—was negatively associated with the
problem-solving element of community policing (p<0.05). Thus, based on this result,
Sheriffs’ Departments with more financial capabilities are less likely to implement
problem-solving activities. Lastly, crime rate is positively related to the organizational
transformation dimension of community policing (p<0.05). In other words, the more
Sheriffs’ Departments experienced higher crime rates, the more likely the agencies were
to adopt innovative organizational approaches to tackle local problems.

Municipal Police Departments in 2000-2003
Table 5.8 reports the association between CP Units in Municipal Police
Departments (between 2000 and 2003) and the three elements of community policing
activities (i.e., community engagement, problem-solving, and organizational
transformation). In short, Model 1 of each analysis, which addressed only the effect of
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CP Units, showed that specialized units in Municipal Police Departments were
significantly associated with each dimension of program implementation in general.4
When control variables were introduced in each model (Model 2), the effect of CP Units
did not change.
First, holding other control variables in the model constant, the effect of CP Units
in Municipal Police departments on the community engagement element of community
policing was marginal and positive (b=0.50, p=0.10). For instance, municipal police
departments with specialized community policing units were predicted to implement 0.50
more programs that engage community members than their counterparts without such
units. Among control variables, the effect of occupational differentiation was statistically
significant and positive (b=0.03, p<0.01). Thus, the more municipal police agencies had
civilian employees, the more likely it was that they performed activities that focused on
the involvement of community members.
Second, CP Units were also associated with the problem-solving element of
community policing, even though the statistical significance of Model 2 was marginal
(b=0.35, p=0.08). When control variables were introduced, the significance level did not
substantively change (b=0.33, p=0.09).
Third, municipal police agencies with CP Units performed considerably more
community policing activities of the organizational transformation element (b=0.32,
p<0.01). That is, taking all four control variables into account, CP Units in Municipal
Police Departments between 2000 and 2003 was positively associated with activities that
engage in setting up new organizational priorities.

4

The only exception is the association between CP Units and the problem-solving element. However, this
relationship was also marginal (p=0.08).
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Table 5.7. Linear panel analysis results of the effect of CP Units in Sheriffs’ Departments (2000-2003)
Community Engagement
Model 1

Problem-Solving

Model 2

Model 1

Organizational Transformation
Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

0.82

0.45

0.50

0.46

-0.34

0.27

-0.33

0.28

0.35

0.19

0.30

0.19

Police Strength

0.12

0.09

-0.08

0.06

-0.03

0.04

Occup. Diff.

0.02

0.01*

-0.01

0.01

0.01

0.00

CP Unit

Budget

-0.46

0.63

-0.77

0.38*

-0.18

0.28

Crime Rate

35.75

48.75

14.71

29.64

54.35

23.93*

n

384

384

384

384

361

361

NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged operating budget. *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Table 5.8. Linear panel analysis results of the effect of CP Units in Municipal Police Departments (2000-2003)
Community Engagement
Model 1

Problem-Solving

Model 2

Model 1

Organizational Transformation
Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

0.61

0.31*

0.50

0.31

0.35

0.20

0.33

0.20

0.36

0.13**

0.32

0.13*

Police Strength

-0.01

0.11

0.06

0.07

0.07

0.05

Occup. Diff.

0.03

0.01**

-0.01

0.01

0.01

0.00**

Budget

-0.71

0.54

-0.06

0.35

-0.15

0.23

-3.91

10.69

-12.02

6.84

1.48

4.69

CP Unit

Crime Rate
n

860

860

862

862

842

842

NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged operating budget. *p<0.05, **p<0.01
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Moreover, as in the case of the community engagement dimension, occupational
differentiation was found to be associated with program implementation that focused on
the organizational transformation aspect (b=0.01, p<0.01).

Interactive Effects
As briefly discussed above, the fact that the relationship between any given pair
of variables in one subsample is significant and not significant in a second subsample
does not necessarily mean that the effect of the predictor is different in the two groups.
For instance, the result that CP Units was a significant factor in Sheriff’s Departments but
not in Municipal Police Department does not necessarily mean that the effect differed
across agency types. Therefore, I compared the coefficients of each community policing
element for Sheriff’s and Municipal Police Departments by using the following formula
suggested by Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and Piquero (1998):

√

where b1 is the slope coefficient for the independent variable for Sheriffs’ Departments,
b2 is the slope coefficient for the same variable for Municipal Police Departments, and
and

are the coefficient variances for each group. As the formula shows, this

formula produces z score that will indicate whether or not the difference of coefficients is
statistically significant (Paternoster et al., 1998).
As noted above, CP Units had a positive and significant relationship with the
community engagement aspect of community policing. Also, occupational differentiation
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had a significant association with the same dimension of community policing both for
Sheriff’s Departments and for Municipal Police Departments. However, there were no
significant differences in the magnitude of the effects for any of the independent
variables (including CP Units and occupational differentiation) on community
engagement across the two types of agencies (see Appendix 3 for all z scores in each
model).
In addition, with respect to the problem-solving element, no significant
differences were found in the magnitude of the effects of independent variables between
Sheriff’s Departments and Municipal Police Departments.
Last, CP Units and occupational differentiation had a positive and significant
relationship with the organizational transformation aspect of community policing only for
Municipal Police Departments. However, the magnitude of the relationship was not
significantly different between two types of agencies. Crime rate had a positive and
significant relationship with the organizational transformation element of community
policing only for Sheriff’s Departments. Additionally, the magnitude of the effects
differed significantly between two types of agencies (z=2.193, p<0.05).

Sheriffs’ Department in 2003-2007
The analyses that employed the LEMAS 2003 and 2007 are presented in Table
5.9. First, CP Units were not found to be associated with the community engagement
element of community policing, even though the association approached significance
(b=0.82, p=0.09). When four control variables were considered in Model 2, the effect of
CP Units did not reach a significance level (p=0.14).
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Second, the CP Units variable was a statistically significant factor in the
association with the problem-solving dimension of community policing activities.
Sheriffs’ Departments with CP Units are more likely to perform activities that necessitate
the introduction of new strategies to solve local crime problems (b=0.66, p<0.01). Also,
the relationship was not mediated by control variables in Model 2 (b=0.67, p<0.01).
Last, CP Units were also statistically significantly related to the organizational
transformation element of community policing (b=0.45, p<0.05). Even when four control
variables were introduced, the association did not change (b=0.52, p<0.01). In other
words, controlling for police strength, occupational differentiation, operating budget, and
crime rate, Sheriffs’ Departments with specialized community policing units are more
likely to put programs in place that focus on the organizational priorities toward training
and evaluation of community policing.

Municipal Police Departments in 2003-2007
The association between CP Units in Municipal Police Departments and the three
distinct elements of community policing between 2003 and 2007 is reported in Table
5.10. Model 1 of each column shows that there were statistically significant relationships
between CP Units and each of the three dimensions of community policing activity under
study. When control variables were introduced, the results indicate that CP Units was still
significantly associated with each community policing element.
First, as Model 2 in the first column shows, net of other variables, CP Units were
found to be positively related to the community engagement element of community
policing (b=1.14, p<0.01). Municipal Police Departments with CP Units implemented an
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average of 1.14 more community policing activities related to the community
engagement.
Second, the effect of CP Units also remained significant and positive in Model 2
of the problem-solving element (b=0.45, p<0.01). That is, holding other independent
variables constant, Municipal Police Departments that operated with CP Units
implemented on average 0.45 more community policing activities that focused on the
problem-solving dimension.
Finally, the association between CP Units and organizational transformation
activities by Municipal Police Departments was also statistically significant and positive,
as was shown in Model 2 (b=0.35, p<0.01). In other words, police departments were
more likely to implement programs that involve setting up new priorities toward training
and evaluation of community policing between 2003 and 2007 controlling for other
variables in the model.

Interactive Effects
Unlike the results of the 2000-2003 data, here CP Units had a significant and
positive relationship with all three elements of community policing both for Sheriff’s
Departments and Municipal Police Departments.5 The comparison of coefficients
between two types of agencies revealed that the magnitude of the effects of CP Units was
significantly different from each other only for the problem-solving element of
community policing. That is, Sheriff’s Departments were significantly more likely to

5

The only exception was in the case of Sheriff’s Department in community engagement element aspect of
community policing. However, the effect also approached significance (p=0.07).
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implement problem-solving aspects of community policing than are Municipal Police
Departments (z=4.020, p<0.05).

Summary
Two separate analyses (2000-2003 and 2003-2007) in Sheriffs’ and Municipal
Police Departments showed slightly different results from each other. Overall, analysis of
the 2000-2003 data showed that the effect of CP Units in Municipal Police Departments
on all three elements of community policing considered in this study was statistically
significant, while this was not the case among Sheriff’s Departments. That is, Municipal
Police Departments with CP Units are more likely to implement each dimension of
community policing programs. It must be noted, however, that the differences between
sheriff and police agencies were not statistically significant.
Regarding results from 2003-2007 data analyses, the change of CP Units had a
positive and significant effect on three elements of community policing, both in Sheriff’s
Departments and Municipal Police Departments. That is, the creation of CP Units affects
the increase of all three elements of community policing activities across both types of
agencies. In addition, the direct effect of CP Units was not mediated by other control
variables. These findings imply that change of CP Units had a direct effect on three
elements of community policing program implementations in both types of agencies. In
other words, the creation of CP Units affects the increase of all three elements of
community policing activities among Sheriff’s Departments and Municipal Police
Departments.
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The comparison of coefficients revealed that the magnitude of the effects of CP
Units on the problem-solving dimension of community policing was significantly
different between Sheriff’s Departments and Municipal Police Departments, while the
other two elements (i.e., community engagement and organizational transformation) did
not show significant differences between two types of agencies.
This chapter attempted to answer two research questions: (1) descriptions of
change of specialized police units; and (2) the effect of such units on the change of
community policing program implementation. First, the results indicated that local police
agencies in the United States from 2000 to 2007 did not operate CP Units in a similar
manner across time and place. While the majority of agencies continued to operate (or
not operate) CP Units during the first decade of the 21st century, the remaining police
agencies were not firm in their consistent operation of the specialized units.
Second, the effect of CP Units on three elements of community policing revealed
somewhat complex patterns. Overall, police agencies with CP Units were more likely to
perform each dimension of community policing activities both in 2000-2003 and 20032007 periods. However, when samples were subdivided into Sheriffs’ Departments and
Municipal Police Departments, different patterns were identified in the association
between the CP Units and community policing program implementation. CP Units in
Municipal Police Departments were positively associated with each element of
community policing activities, and this association was constant in both periods.
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Table 5.9. Linear panel analysis results of the effect of CP Units in Sheriffs’ Departments (2003-2007)
Community Engagement
Model 1

Problem-Solving

Model 2

Model 1

Organizational Transformation
Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

0.82

0.48

0.73

0.50

0.66

0.20**

0.67

0.21**

0.45

0.19*

0.52

0.20**

Police Strength

0.06

0.09

0.02

0.04

-0.06

0.04

Occup. Diff.

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

CP Units

Budget

-0.40

0.51

0.18

0.21

0.06

0.21

Crime Rate

-30.37

43.82

-26.88

18.43

20.12

20.22

n

385

385

387

387

355

355

NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged operating budget. *p<0.05, **p<0.0

Table 5.10. Linear panel analysis results of the effect of CP Units in Municipal Police Departments (2003-2007)
Community Engagement
Model 1

Problem-Solving

Model 2

Model 1

Organizational Transformation
Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

1.16

0.25**

1.14

0.25**

0.43

0.11**

0.45

0.11**

0.36

0.11**

0.35

0.11**

0.08

0.06

0.03

0.03

0.03

0.03

Occup. Diff.

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.00

-0.00

0.00

Budget

-0.17

0.36

0.03

0.16

0.19

0.16

Crime Rate

-7.80

8.73

3.73

3.94

-3.80

4.04

CP Units
Police Strength

n

864

864

865

865

831

831

NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged operating budget. *p<0.05, **p<0.01
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With regard to Sheriffs’ Departments, results suggest that the effect of CP Units
was not constant over time. Between 2000 and 2003, CP Units failed to show significant
association with all three elements of community policing activities. In 2003 and 2007,
however, Sheriffs’ Departments with CP Units were more likely to implement each
dimension of community policing program implementation.
Finally, the comparison of coefficients showed that the effect of CP Units differed
between the two types of agencies only for the problem-solving aspect of community
policing in the 2003-2007 period. Except for this element, the effect of CP Units on
community policing activities was not different across two types of agencies.
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation examined two related issues: temporal changes in the operation
of specialized community policing units (CP Units) by local law enforcement agencies
and the effect of such specialized units on the change of three distinct elements of
community policing activities in such agencies. In particular, I performed linear panel
analysis using three waves of data from the LEMAS to investigate the changes of
community policing outputs and the factors that significantly contributed to such
changes.
Policing scholars have been critical of the increased creation of diverse
specialized units by local police departments, due in part to possible inter-unit conflicts.
Specifically, after the widespread introduction of the community policing philosophy,
proponents of this approach argued that police organizations need to despecialize their
structure—i.e., decrease specialized units—and their personnel (e.g., Goldstein, 1987).
This dissertation is one of very few studies to look at the link between the presence of
specialized units and organizational outputs.
One of several advances this dissertation made in the study of specialized police
units involved the nature of the analyses performed. Previous studies were largely limited
to cross-sectional analyses (see Langworthy, 2002). While these studies provided some
insight into organizational behavior at one point in time, they were not able to draw
conclusions regarding how police organizational structure tends to evolve and change
across time. This dissertation was an effort to trace such changes—specifically, changes
of outputs in three distinct elements of community policing activities. By using linear
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panel techniques to control for time-invariant factors, the analyses yielded useful
evidence about how specialized units affected the change in outputs.

Operations of Specialized Units
The results of descriptive and inferential analyses revealed complex pictures of
changes and roles of specialized CP Units of the agencies that responded to the LEMAS
sample. First, wide variations in the operation of specialized police units among police
agencies seemed to exist between 2000 and 2007. Proponents of contingency theory may
argue that police departments are more likely to create specialized units to tackle newly
emerging social problems in an efficient and effective manner (Lawrence and Lorsch,
1967). In fact, the increase of some specialized units (e.g., cyber-crime, hate crime,
missing child, and terrorism units) seems to reflect social changes—in particular ,after the
late 1990s—and police departments’ responses to tackle diverse problems arising from
such changes.
An alternative explanation is that, as some institutional theorists have suggested
(e.g., Crank and Langworthy, 1992; Katz, 2001), police agencies may be vulnerable to
pressures from powerful actors in their communities, notably local elected officials,
media, and special interest groups. As Skogan and Frydl (2004:310) argued:
Creating a relatively small but highly focused specialist unit to cope with a given
problem may do little to reduce that problem, but it does a great deal to alleviate
pressure from the community without disrupting many organizational routines.
In fact, as discussed earlier, prior research supports this institutional perspective,
but most empirical studies tend to examine a limited type of specialized units—for
instance, gang units (Katz, 2001; Katz, Maguire, and Roncek, 2002; Weisel and Shelley,
2004), bias crime units (Walker and Katz, 1995), or crime analysis units (Giblin, 2006).
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Further research is necessary to investigate the process underlying the increase (or
decrease) of specialized units operated by local police departments.
The decrease of some units can also be interpreted in a similar way. For instance,
contingency theorists may argue that police agencies’ decreasing reliance on some units
(e.g., juvenile crime and drug education) may be a sign of strategic changes in dealing
with some social problems and concerns. According to the institutional perspective, if a
police department gets rid of a specialized unit, this elimination could be considered as “a
symbolic gesture” by local residents that the agency does not think the task performed by
the unit is important (Maguire, 1997:570). Thus, decrease of some specialized units
among police agencies may mean that the organizations think local communities are
willing to accept the agencies’ reduced attention to some functions. Further research may
look into the different dynamics involved in the increase and decrease of specialized
units.

Effect of Specialized Community Policing Units on Community Policing Outputs
Linear panel analysis also showed some interesting effects of CP Units on
community policing outputs. Overall, the results showed that police agencies with CP
Units were more likely to produce outputs in each element of community policing. When
samples were divided into two groups (i.e., Sheriffs’ Departments and Municipal Police
Departments), however, the results were not consistent in both groups.
First, in Sheriffs’ Departments, CP Units were found to be associated with outputs
of community policing activities in 2000-2003, but not in the 2003-2007 period. This
research cannot provide a conclusive interpretation for this discrepancy. As will be
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shown later, some factors not included in this research might play a role in this different
association between CP Units and community policing outputs. For instance, considering
that the leaders of Sheriff’s Departments are directly elected by local residents, it may be
the case that the leaders of sheriff’s department themselves play an essential role in
producing community policing outputs.
Second, results showed that municipal police departments with specialized units
were more likely to generate outputs in all three dimensions of community policing. The
positive association between CP Units and community policing outputs held over time,
even after controlling for numerous other factors that may influence community policing
activities. In other words, police agencies with CP Units are more likely to produce more
outputs compared to other agencies without such units, independent of
intraorganizational factors and crime rate.
Taken all together, what do these results mean? The results show that the creation
of community policing units leads to more outputs in all three elements of community
policing. In other words, the creation of specialized units may lead to increase of outputs
that the units are intended to produce.
Of course, the increased community policing outputs do not necessarily equate to
the increase of positive outcomes (e.g., satisfaction of police, reduction of crime, etc.) per
se. However, potential inter-unit conflicts or indifference of officers from other units may
not hinder the community policing program implementation, as has been shown in other
studies (e.g., Maguire and Gantley, 2009a). In short, along with a symbolic role played by
a specialized unit, the unit can also produce more outputs after it is created.
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Limitations
Like any study, this research is not without limitations. First of all, the “dosage”
of community policing in each element was not considered. The present study included
almost every indicator of community policing activities listed in three waves of the
LEMAS, but these dimensions are not necessarily exhaustive indicators of community
policing efforts by police agencies. For instance, police agencies having numerous
partnership agreements with community groups were not differentiated from agencies
with a single partnership contract.
Similarly, this dissertation also assumed the consistency of definitions on survey
items across time and place (Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000; Wilson, 2004). In other
words, the “quality” of community policing was not controlled in this study. For
example, “partnership” with local groups may not mean the same among all police
agencies. While some police departments highlight the close interaction with community
groups, some others may only hold formal meetings intended to disseminate police
information to residents.
Second, I assumed for the purposes of analysis that all specialized units might
function in a similar manner. However, in reality, not all community policing units are
created equal. CP Units in some police agencies may be equipped with more personnel,
resources, and other organizational support. In contrast, other units may be left alone
without receiving organizational attention and resources. The assumption that all
specialized units with full-time sworn personnel might behave in a similar manner might
not hold in some agencies.
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Third, the sample in this research included local police agencies that participated
in all three waves of data collection. Nevertheless, it is possible that agencies that took
part in all three surveys may not be the same as their counterparts that chose not to be
involved in the LEMAS data collection efforts. In other words, these results may not be
generalizable to all police agencies in the United States, and the arguments based on the
results may thus be considered tentative and explorative. Also, this research included
only agencies with one hundred or more officers in any wave of data selection. Thus, the
results in this research may not be generalizable to small police agencies.
Lastly, the time interval used in the longitudinal analysis may not be short enough
to examine the immediate effect of change of CP Units on output production. In two
separate analyses, the data had three- and four-year gaps. Many organizational and
environmental changes (e.g., change of leadership, federal funding, and local politics,
etc.) that are not addressed in this study could have taken place during the period.

FUTURE RESEARCH
This dissertation has shown that specialized units play a role in producing
community policing outputs in local police departments. However, researchers may want
to consider other factors for a better understanding of the association between specialized
units and output production. For instance, future studies should take more
intraorganizational factors into account in discussing community policing
implementation.
First, a police union variable can be introduced because organizational factors are
not limited to size, occupational differentiation, or budget. Rather, line-staff issues are
also important in dealing with local police agency operations. For instance, unionized
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departments have been shown to affect organizational behavior as well as the pay and
benefits of police officers (Reiss, 1992). Also, agencies’ collective bargaining power is
negatively associated with the percentage of sustained complaints against police use of
force (Hickman and Piquero, 2009). Police unions can be a barrier to community
policing, not only because more responsibilities can fall on officers, but also because line
officers may think that their position in crime prevention is threatened (Skolnick and
Bayley, 1988). In fact, unions in police organizations have been regarded as facilitators of
officers’ salaries and benefits, but also as obstacles to innovative changes in policing
(Walker and Katz, 2010).
Second, more socioeconomic variables should be taken into account in future
research endeavors to see if other environmental factors mediate the association between
CP Units and the implementation of community policing programs. As Maguire and
Mastrofski (2000:16) suggested, the new policing philosophy gained popularity among
practitioners as well as scholars “not because the ideas of community policing are new or
revolutionary, but because the environment is now conducive to the support and
nourishment of ideas that earlier fell on barren ground.” In other words, police
departments situated in different settings are likely to perform community policing in a
different manner due to different environmental factors.
The roles and strategies taken by CP Units are shaped depending on their
situations. For instance, Skogan and Hartnett (1997) found stronger support for police
among Whites than among African-Americans and Hispanics in Chicago. Also, AfricanAmerican and Hispanic residents in Chicago were more likely than White people to think
that Chicago police are impolite, unconcerned, unhelpful, and unfair. Unfavorable
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attitudes toward the police by ethnic minorities may decrease the likelihood of their
participation in community policing, particularly partnering with law enforcement
agencies (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997). Moreover, people who own their own houses and
have jobs have a higher probability of attending such community policing activities
(Skogan, 2006b). Thus, investigation of the association between CP Units and
organizational surroundings may increase our understanding of how specialized units
perform in a variety of situations.
Third, the role of influential individuals in implementing diverse community
policing programs needs to be taken into consideration (Chaiken, 2001; Eck and
Rosenbaum, 1994; Kitzman and Stanard, 1999; Maguire, 1997). Community policing can
be implemented in a completely different manner depending on the experiences and
personalities of top police officers. Specific programs can also be interrupted or
discontinued when confronted with changing leadership in police departments (Skogan
and Hartnett, 1997). Lyons (1999: 50) even argued that the major vehicle for community
policing in the city is not communities, but rather “reform-conscious police managers.”
In addition, political leaders, especially elected officials, can influence the
implementation of policing strategies or initiatives. Local politicians have a valid reason
to introduce a fresh approach when faced with criticism due to rising crime in their
communities. Recently, studies have started to show that local politicians’ roles may be
an important variable that can determine the implementation of community policing
(Chaiken, 2001). For instance, Jacobs (2010: 199) argued that “mayors directly control
police chiefs in most cities,” which may mean that the role of elected officials cannot be
excluded in discussing factors that affect police activities. Thus, more research is
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necessary to examine whether influential local leaders moderate the relationship between
CP Units and their output.
Fourth, the role of the federal government’s intervention in community policing
was not included in this research, but has been studied by others in the field (Johnson and
Roth, 2003; Skogan and Hartnett, 1997). Since the establishment of the Office of
Community Oriented Policing Service (COPS) in 1994 by the federal government, COPS
has been the major source of funding for local police agencies in implementing
community policing. In fact, in the fiscal year 2000, COPS spent $685.3 million to assist
local police departments’ community policing activities (COPS, 2011). Thus, it may not
be surprising to find that agencies try to focus on specific dimensions of community
policing strategies to attain federal grants (Worrall and Zhao, 2003). From the standpoint
of funding agencies, how financial resources are spent should be examined in future
research.
Lastly, it is worthwhile to look into other types of specialized units. Not much
scholarly attention has been paid to the effect of various types of police units—for
instance, missing child units, cyber-crime units, and research and planning units. Do
police agencies arrest more cyber criminals when they create cyber-crime units? How
much faster do police departments process crime scene investigations after they create
their own crime analysis units? More research is critical to answer these questions.
Examining police specialized units will definitely increase the understanding of
organizational behavior and performance by police agencies.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LEMAS ADMINISTRATION
As noted above, the LEMAS has been a critical tool to comprehend trends across
police organizations in the United States and their operations. Since its initiation in 1987,
researchers have utilized the dataset from diverse points of view; studies based on the
LEMAS have greatly improved the understanding of police organizations. In fact,
information collected by the LEMAS is an “extraordinary vehicle” to trace the changes of
police organizations and factors associated with such changes (Langworthy, 2002).
Nevertheless, despite its common use, the inherent limitations of the data collection
method and other issues involved in the LEMAS need to be mentioned (Walker and Katz,
1995). Thus, I will provide a few suggestions for improved administration of the future
LEMAS.
First, prior studies showed that false or overstated information was included in the
LEMAS (e.g., Maguire and Katz, 2002). As shown above, this research also found that
some respondents did not seem to take care when filling out their questionnaire.
Therefore, it is critical to develop a tool to guarantee the validity and reliability of data.
For instance, randomly selected samples may be contacted to verify whether responses
reflect organizational reality. Further, data may be collected and analyzed by “a neutral
agency” to decrease respondents’ temptation to paint an overstated picture of their
organizations (Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000).
Second, consistency of the same survey question items included in the earlier
waves of the LEMAS need to be maintained in future data collection. Of course, a survey
needs to reflect the change of police organizations and their environment—for instance,
introduction of new operations (e.g., terrorism prevention) and equipment (e.g., drones)
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to examine how police departments perform their tasks. However, some key structural
items (civilian staffs, salary of officers, different types of jobs performed by officers, etc.)
and operational items (community policing, operation of specialized units, etc.) need to
be continued in the subsequent surveys. By doing so, researchers can examine the
temporal patterns of police operations as well as organizational structure. Also, the
factors that may contribute to such changes can be identified by merging with other data
sources. In short, longitudinal data analysis from multiple waves of the LEMAS will be
possible only when data are collected on the same areas of police work.

CONCLUSIONS
Despite some skepticism regarding the specialization of police organizations, the
history of American policing shows how division of labor has become the norm in many
police departments. The federal government has created special agencies to carry out
specially defined tasks when new problems arise (Walker and Katz, 2010). The Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives are some examples of such specialized federal agencies. Local
police departments have also undergone division of labor to deal with new social
problems as they arise.
Within this context, this study attempted to show that specialization within the
community policing era is indeed a reality in American policing in the 21st century. After
widespread introduction of community policing philosophy, policing scholars have
highlighted despecialization of organizational structure and personnel. The present
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research, however, shows that police agencies have increasingly depended on some
specialized units to deal with specifically defined local problems since the early 2000s.
Additionally, this dissertation disclosed that a specialized unit may have more
than symbolic value. That is, specialized units can also be tools for police agencies to
solve local problems in effective ways. As Smith (1902[1776]:43) argued, “The greatest
improvement in the productive powers of labor, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity,
and judgment with which it is anywhere directed, or applied, seem to have been the
effects of the division of labor.” Thus, it is worthwhile to examine how specialization
within police agencies contributes to increased effectiveness and/or improved efficiency
of organizational performance. This results of this dissertation provide a first contribution
to the research literature in this area.
Specialization, or division of labor, may reflect broader social changes rather than
simple organizational devices to show off police leaders’ temporary interests (Durkheim,
1933). In times when police have to deal with numerous unprecedented challenges within
their communities, it is time to think over whether a simple dichotomy—specialization
vs. despecialization (or generalization)—is beneficial for police agencies. Namely, it
needs to be investigated how community policing and specialization can be compatible in
daily policing. Thus, policing scholars and police practitioners need to pay more attention
to this relatively new organizational phenomenon and examine its roles and effects on
police departments in a more detailed manner.
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APPENDIX 1. MERGING THREE WAVES OF THE LEMAS

The procedure of constructing the dataset for the present study was composed of
two stages. First, the LEMAS 2000 and 2003 have the same identifying code that makes
it possible to merge the two datasets: Agency ID. Agency ID is a 16-digit code, and
merging two datasets is possible by matching the code. Thus, the LEMAS “2000/2003”
was produced by merging the two datasets using a variable name AGENCYID.
Merging the LEMAS 2007 with the 2000/2003 dataset was more complicated.
The LEMAS 2007 does not have the Agency ID code that is available in the LEMAS
2000 and 2003. Rather, it has other ID codes not included in the LEMAS 2000 and 2003.
For instance, the LEMAS 2007 contains the Originating Reporting Identification (ORI)
code. The ORI code was developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to link the
Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and other data source (Wells and Falcone, 2005). Also
included is a Survey ID that is unique to the each wave of the LEMAS.
The LEMAS 2000 and 2003 also have other ID codes. For instance, the LEMAS
2000 and 2003 have Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) that are five-digit
codes. Also included is the six digit numerical Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) code.
However, the LEMAS 2007 does not have all these codes. Therefore, without any linking
tool or dataset, it is not possible to merge the 2000/2003 dataset with the LEMAS 2007.
The Law Enforcement Agency Identifiers Crosswalk File (referred to as
Crosswalk hereafter) was helpfully developed by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the
National Archive of Criminal Justice Data in 2000 to solve these hurdles in combining
several datasets (Lindgren and Zawitz, 2001). Before the introduction of the Crosswalk,
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matching different datasets in criminal justice areas with other socioeconomic data was
limited or challenging. However, the Crosswalk makes it possible for researchers to
merge diverse datasets to conduct agency-level analyses. For instance, the UCR can be
merged with US Census data and LEMAS through ID codes included in the Crosswalk.
So far, three versions of the Crosswalk (1996, 2000, and 2005) have been produced by
BJS, and all three are publicly accessible through the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research.
To merge the LEMAS 2000/2003 and 2007 dataset, I chose the most recent
Crosswalk file—Crosswalk 2005. Among ID codes included in the Crosswalk 2005 are
ORI codes and AGENCY ID codes. The latter codes are the same codes that are used in
the LEMAS 2000 and 2007. Thus, by matching the LEMAS 2007 and the Crosswalk
2005 using ORI codes, the merged file now included the AGENCY ID variable, which
enabled me to merge with the LEMAS 2000/2003. The matching process is shown in
Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1. Procedure for Merging Datasets
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APPENDIX 2. RECODING SOME CASES

Prior studies indicated that police agencies “over-respond” to some questions
when filling out the LEMAS survey (e.g., Walker and Katz, 1995). That is, even when
police departments did not have a specific subunit, some survey respondents tend to
answer in a socially desirable way. For instance, when the community policing
philosophy has attracted a favorable response from community members and politicians,
it is likely that survey respondents may say that their agencies have a community policing
unit when, in fact, they do not.
The survey instrument for this item is relatively clear and obvious. The question
in the LEMAS asks if the police department “has specialized unit with full-time
personnel to address this problem/task,” followed by a list of subunits including
community policing units. In spite of clarity of the question, it is possible that some
agencies did not provide correct information on this item intentionally or unintentionally.
It is theoretically possible for researchers to check the reliability of answers by contacting
police organizations. Obviously, this verification is costly and time-consuming to check
the reliability of all the answers in the dataset. Thus, I decided to use an indicator item in
the LEMAS to verify if agencies that answered they had a community policing unit really
did have such a unit.
In the early part of the LEMAS survey, it asks police organizations the number of
community policing officers, community relations officers, or other sworn personnel who
are “specifically designated” to community policing activities. Thus, agencies without
such officers are expected not to have community policing units. In other words, agencies
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that answered none in the number of community policing officers are supposed to check
“No Community Policing Unit.” If, however, agencies answered that they had separate
community policing units though they did not have any community policing personnel, it
is safe to say that the police departments did not provide correct information. There were
20 agencies (15 in the LEMAS 2003 and 5 in the LEMAS 2007) that were identified as
having provided misleading data. I recoded these cases as “No CP Unit.”
Visual check of the data also revealed some interesting points. For instance,
according to the data, the Laredo Police Department in Laredo, Texas, had a CP Unit in
2000 with 205 community policing officers, but did not have a CP unit in 2003 and only
reported seven designated officers. In 2007, the number of officers remained the same,
but the agency had a CP Unit. Also, Salt Lake City Police Department had a CP Unit in
2003 with eight community policing officers, but in 2007, the department did not report a
CP Unit although the number of officers increased to 30. It is possible that agencies
eliminated their formal CP Units and subsequently increased the number of officers
committed to community policing activities. Also, the creation of CP Units does not
necessarily mean that such agencies increase number of personnel in implementing the
tasks. Therefore, I assumed the data to be true in these cases. Recoded cases are shown in
Table A.1.
Thus, I matched the item with other indicator of community policing units in the
survey. The LEMAS survey from 2000 to 2007 included a question asking the number of
community policing officers or other officers who were “specifically designated to
engage in community policing activities.” Therefore, if a police department answered “0”
on the number of community policing officers, but answered “Yes” on the item of
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community policing unit, the mismatch represents an error (intentional or unintentional).
When I checked this issue, I uncovered 20 cases (or police agencies) that did not answer
consistently.
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Table A.1. Recoded Police Agencies (n=20)
NUM2000

NUM2003

NUM2007

CP Units2000

CP Units2003

CP Units07

NAME OF AGENCY

CITY/COUNTY

STATE

20

0

20

YES

NO*

NO

OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF

Martinez

CA

0

0

0

NO

NO*

NO

MONTEREY COUNTY

Salinas

CA

101

0

0

NO

NO

NO*

GARDEN GROVE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Garden Grove

CA

432

0

40

NO

NO*

YES

SACRAMENTO POLICE DEPARTMENT

Sacramento

CA

19

0

6

YES

NO*

YES

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SHERIFFS

San Bernardino

CA

10

0

10

YES

NO*

YES

SAN BERNARDINO POLICE DEPARTMENT

San Bernardino

CA

11

12

0

NO

YES

NO*

DANBURY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Danbury

CT

6

0

248

YES

NO*

NO

MACOMB COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE

Mount Clemens

MI

2

0

0

NO

NO*

NO

OAKLAND COUNTRY SHERIFFS OFFICE

Pontiac

MI

151

6

0

YES

YES

NO*

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Detroit

MI

3

0

3

YES

NO*

YES

BLOOMINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

Bloomington

MN

18

21

0

YES

YES

NO*

GULFPORT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Gulfport

MS

11

0

8

YES

NO*

NO

JACKSON POLICE DEPARTMENT

Jackson

MS

99

0

12

YES

NO*

NO

GUILFORD COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE

Greensboro

NC

35

0

250

YES

NO*

NO

PROVIDENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Providence

RI

319

0

4

YES

NO*

NO

CHATTANOOGA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chattanooga

TN

36

28

0

YES

YES

NO*

HARRIS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Houston

TX

5

0

1

NO

NO*

YES

CLARK COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE

Vancouver

WA

0

0

4

NO

NO*

YES

VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT

Vancouver

WA

8

0

111

NO

NO*

NO

FEDERAL WAY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Federal Way

WA

NOTE: NUM2000 denotes the number of community policing officers in 2000.
* denotes recoded cases from YES to NO due to inconsistent answers in the data.
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APPENDIX 3. Z SCORES FROM COMPARISONS OF
COEFFICIENTS
Table A.3.1. Comparison of coefficients between Sheriff’s Departments and
Municipal Police Departments in 2000-2003 (Community Engagement)
Sheriffs’ Department

Municipal Police Department

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

z score

CP Units

0.50

0.46

0.50

0.31

-0.002

Police Strength

0.12

0.09

-0.01

0.11

0.861

Occup. Diff.

0.02

0.01*

0.03

0.01**

-0.751

Budget

-0.46

0.63

-0.71

0.54

0.385

Crime Rate

35.75

48.75

-3.91

10.69

0.795

n

384

860

NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged
operating budget. *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Table A.3.2. Comparison of coefficients between Sheriff’s Departments and
Municipal Police Departments in 2000-2003 (Problem-Solving)
Sheriffs’ Department

Municipal Police Department

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

z score

CP Units

-0.33

0.28

0.33

0.20

-1.929

Police Strength

-0.08

0.06

0.06

0.07

-1.596

Occup. Diff.

-0.01

0.01

-0.01

0.01

0.284

Budget

-0.77

0.38*

-0.06

0.35

-1.354

Crime Rate

14.71

29.64

-12.02

6.84

0.877

n

384

862

NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged
operating budget. *p<0.05, **p<0.01
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Table A.3.3. Comparison of coefficients between Sheriff’s Departments and
Municipal Police Departments in 2000-2003 (Organizational Transformation)
Sheriffs’ Department

Municipal Police Department

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

z score

CP Units

0.30

0.19

0.32

0.13*

-0.093

Police Strength

-0.03

0.04

0.07

0.05

-1.509

Occup. Diff.

0.01

0.00

0.01

0.00**

1.341

Budget

-0.18

0.28

-0.15

0.23

-0.059

Crime Rate

54.35

23.93*

1.48

4.69

2.193

n

361

842

NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged
operating budget. *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Table A.3.4. Comparison of coefficients between Sheriff’s Departments and
Municipal Police Departments in 2003-2007 (Community Engagement)
Sheriffs’ Department

Municipal Police Department

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

z score

CP Units

0.73

0.50

1.14

0.25**

-0.739

Police Strength

0.06

0.09

0.08

0.06

0.121

Occup. Diff.

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.01

-1.113

Budget

-0.40

0.51

-0.17

0.36

-3.504

Crime Rate

-30.37

43.82

-7.80

8.73

-0.505

n

385

864

NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged
operating budget. *p<0.05, **p<0.01
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Table A.3.5. Comparison of coefficients between Sheriff’s Departments and
Municipal Police Departments in 2003-2007 (Problem-Solving)
Sheriffs’ Department

Municipal Police Department

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

z score

CP Units

0.67

0.21**

0.45

0.11**

4.020

Police Strength

0.02

0.04

0.03

0.03

-0.189

Occup. Diff.

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.00

1.178

Budget

0.18

0.21

0.03

0.16

0.577

Crime Rate

-26.88

18.43

3.73

3.94

-1.624

n

387

865

NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged
operating budget. *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Table A.3.6. Comparison of coefficients between Sheriff’s Departments and
Municipal Police Departments in 2003-2007 (Organizational Transformation)
Sheriffs’ Department

Municipal Police Department

Coefficients

S.E.

Coefficients

S.E.

z score

CP Units

0.52

0.20**

0.35

0.11**

0.748

Police Strength

-0.06

0.04

0.03

0.03

-1.592

Occup. Diff.

0.00

0.00

-0.00

0.00

0.514

Budget

0.06

0.21

0.19

0.16

-0.775

Crime Rate

20.12

20.22

-3.80

4.04

1.160

n

355

831

NOTE: CP Unit=Community policing unit; Occup. Diff.=Occupational differentiation; Budget=Logged
operating budget. *p<0.05, **p<0.01
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